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Abstract 
 Researchers have recently noted college students fail validity measures and base rate data 
are needed for students meeting Slick et al.’s criteria (1999) for malingering. The association 
between meeting Slick Criteria and subsequent recommendations (i.e., to receive external gain) 
is unknown as is the diagnostic utility of embedded validity indices in this population. The 
authors utilized archival data from: 1) a university psychological clinic (n = 986) and 2) a 
university student control sample (n = 182). Measures included the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale-III, Wechsler Memory Scale-III, and Personality Assessment Inventory. Empirically 
supported embedded validity indices were utilized to retrospectively identify suspected 
malingering patients. Group performance, according to level of symptom credibility and level of 
incentive seeking, was evaluated through a series of multivariate mean comparisons. Data are 
presented for frequency of falling in the noncredible range on all validity indices. Diagnostic 
statistics for each index are presented according to hypothetical base rates. Examination of 
receiving psychological recommendations to obtain external incentive (i.e., academic 
accommodations, medications, etc.) is reported according to incentive and credibility level.  
University patients explicitly seeking external gain, particularly those meeting criteria for 
malingering, demonstrated lower performance on the measures and received a higher rate of 
recommendations for academic accommodations and/or medications than patients not seeking 
external incentive. Nevertheless, a number of diagnostic statistics indicated some embedded 
validity indices lack specificity for malingering in university samples. The current study supports 
classifying patients according to level of incentive seeking when evaluating neurocognitive 
performance and feigned or exaggerated deficits. 
 
 
1 
Introduction and Review of Literature 
 
Studies of response biases in psychology have evolved over time. Early clinical studies 
and applications largely addressed how self-report biases were manifested in an individual’s 
psychological symptom presentation via symptom minimization or exaggeration (i.e., faking 
good, faking bad), and subsequently influence case conceptualization for treatment and 
healthcare utilization planning (Meehl & Hathaway, 1946). Thus, common terms such as 
symptom exaggeration or symptom magnification provided clinical insight into an individual’s 
style of reporting symptoms. While still used in that manner, the study of response biases has 
expanded as the clinical practice of psychology has rapidly encroached into forensic endeavors 
within the past twenty years. In fact, Sweet, Peck, Abromowitz, and Etzweiler (2002) estimated 
that practicing clinical neuropsychologists spend an average of nearly 10 hours per week 
involved with forensic activities. 
As psychological testimony regarding clinical cases is often proffered as legal evidence, 
its accuracy and validity have repeatedly been subjected to scrutiny. This has led to applying 
various legal precedents to expert testimony to establish admissibility and legal acceptability 
standards in court (i.e., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993; Frye v. United States, 
1923; Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 1999). One aspect of this matter entails whether or not a given 
individual who has undergone psychological evaluation has presented him- or herself in an 
honest fashion to the expert psychologist, and legal challenges frequently regard accurately 
interpreting psychological test data in the courtroom. This issue is particularly pressing in cases 
involving potential monetary and/or civil liberties implications. 
 Among other circumstances, the context of such expert testimony may include rendering 
opinions in simple civil litigation, complex disability determination, evaluating 
neuropsychological sequelae of traumatic brain injury (TBI) secondary to motor vehicle 
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accidents, or giving opinions regarding level of cognitive status following chemical exposure. 
Psychological testimony is often used by vested legal parties to ascribe legal responsibility for 
damages with the hope of obtaining compensation for those damages. In such cases there is 
usually at least one party (e.g., a claimant) alleging psychological injury in order to benefit from 
a secondary gain. Such a clear external incentive may serve as an influential factor in how an 
individual claimant presents psychologically, especially when monetary settlements or damage 
awards are proportional to the degree of injury that the claimant demonstrates. It then follows 
that persons undergoing psychological evaluation while seeking psychological and/or 
neuropsychological damage awards potentially have an interest in presenting with impairments. 
Consequently, there are significant implications for identifying, quantifying, and then accounting 
for negative response biases in psychological testing within the legal arena to recognize 
illegitimate claims (i.e., identify those with noncredible performance). On a societal level, 
noncredible neurocognitive performance has been shown to have substantial costs. It is estimated 
that feigned behavior is present in nearly 20% of all cases presenting for medical care each year, 
which results in nearly $5 billion for associated legal and medical expenses (Ford, 1983; 
Gouvier, Lees-Haley, & Hammer, 2003).  
In their survey of clinical neuropsychology diplomates, Mittenberg et al. (2002) reported 
that out of 33, 531 patients, malingering prevalence ranged from 8% of medical cases to 35% of 
fibromyalgia/chronic fatigue cases, with high rates for disability, litigation, and criminal cases as 
well. Those percentages are an average across referral sources, and are particularly high in cases 
being referred from defense oriented sources in cases involving civil litigation. Moreover, 
Ardolf, Denney, and Houston (2007) recently reported that the combined rate of malingered 
neurocognitive dysfunction (MND) was 54.3% for a sample of serially referred criminal 
defendants. According to Mittenberg et al. (2002) the rate is much lower in patients not involved 
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with litigation or seeking compensation (approximately 7%). However, malingering prevalence 
rates vary widely across settings, and are influenced by factors including reason for referral and 
referral source (Bigler, 2006; Mittenberg et al., 2002). Not only that, but researchers have noted 
that neurocognitive complaints and symptom exaggeration (i.e., disrupted attention and 
concentration) occur in psychiatric groups, head injured individuals, and normal participants 
(Delis & Wetter, 2007; Gouvier, Cubic, Jones, & Brantley, 1992; Kirmayer & Sartorius, 2007; 
Lees-Haley, Earnest, & Dolezal-Wood, 1995). 
In addition to exaggerating or fabricating symptoms for legal claims, there are multiple 
sources of external secondary gain (e.g., making insurance claims, avoiding military duty) that 
may prompt individuals to employ a negative response bias, which may affect the likelihood of 
malingering. However, malingering research most often pertains to legal settings, as the 
consequences for successful malingering under those circumstances are dramatic and typically 
involve multiple parties. Other areas of non-financial external secondary gain (e.g., medication-
seeking, opportunity for service utilization) have gone relatively unstudied until recently (Henry, 
2005; Osmon, Plambeck, Klein, & Mano, 2006).  
Just as effort and financial incentives have been shown to account for significant variance 
in neuropsychological test performance (Binder & Rohling, 1996; Green, Rohling, Lees-Haley, 
& Allen, 2001), it is thought that other forms of incentive are also related to neuropsychological 
performance. Therefore, the current project seeks to explore the effects of non-financial external 
gain on popular neuropsychological tests in a young adult clinical sample with the expectation 
that performance in individuals overtly seeking non-financial incentives in the context of 
evaluations is poorer than in individuals not expressing potential for external gain. Moreover, it 
is likely the case that individuals expressing potential for non-financial external gain have a 
higher proportion of noncredible performance on test validity measures given symptom 
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exaggeration may be higher in such a population in order to obtain external gain. Thus, the 
application of existing methods for detecting noncredible neuropsychological performance needs 
to be extended to other populations without financial gain to explore effects of incentive level as 
it can be conceptualized on a continuum. 
 In this project, the author briefly describes a contemporary definition of malingering 
along with common and novel methods for detecting noncredible neurocognitive performance 
with particular emphasis on using traditional neuropsychological measures. Through that 
description, the author discusses the application of those methods to populations not involved in 
legal or other financial-seeking populations. Next, the author provides a discussion of literature 
weaknesses and strengths, and presents an overview of research of noncredible neurocognitive 
performance as it relates to sources of non-financial external gain in academic settings. Finally, a 
rationale for the current data analyses follows to address concerns raised by obvious gaps in the 
current literature. In particular, the author discusses identifying non-financial compensation 
seeking behavior in relation to noncredible neurocognitive performance and offers specific 
hypotheses for the project. 
Defining Malingering and Noncredible Neurocognitive Performance 
While the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; 
APA, 2000) contains criteria for defining malingering as a v-code (not a diagnosis of a mental 
disorder per se), that description is considered by many to be inexact and vague. In response, 
researchers have offered other definitions and commentary to help guide clinical and forensic 
practice (Bianchini, Mathias, & Greve, 2001; Boone, 2007b; Greiffenstein, Baker, & Gola, 1994; 
Slick, Sherman, & Iverson, 1999). Among the formal definitions, Slick et al. (1999) have 
proposed the most cited and widely applied classification scheme of noncredible neurocognitive 
performance, referred to as the Slick Criteria. According to Slick et al. (1999), MND is “the 
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volitional exaggeration or fabrication of cognitive dysfunction for the purpose of obtaining 
substantial material gain, or avoiding or escaping formal duty or responsibility.” (p. 552). Their 
system includes three categories of malingering based on the degree of evidence and level of 
certainty that an individual is actually malingering. The categories range from possible to 
probable to definite malingering, with the definite category representing the highest degree of 
certainty that an individual is in fact malingering neurocognitive impairment. 
 In order to classify an individual according to one of those levels of malingering, that 
person must display specific behaviors falling along four distinct areas outlined by Slick et al. 
(1999). The first level of evidence (Criterion A) requires that the individual has a substantial 
external incentive to display a response bias at the time of evaluation. Criterion B specifies that 
within the context of a substantial incentive, there must be direct evidence of a response bias 
from objective neuropsychological testing. Criterion C requires the presence of a response bias 
from a self-report source (e.g., personality inventory). Finally, Criterion D stipulates that 
Criterion B and/or Criterion C data are not fully accounted for by psychiatric, neurological, or 
developmental factors. 
 In application, there are several combinations of Criterion B and C evidence that may be 
employed in order to classify an individual as a malingerer. For example, Slick et al. (1999) 
further subdivided Criterion B evidence (neuropsychological data) into six areas: 1) a definite 
response bias (i.e., below chance, p < .05), on one or more forced-choice tests, 2) a probable 
response bias represented by results from a “well-validated” test or index, 3) a discrepancy 
between current neuropsychological test results and objective profiles of known brain function 
and dysfunction, 4) discrepancy between test results and actual behaviors, 5) discrepancy 
between test results and informant reports, or 6) discrepancy between test results and the 
individual’s known history. Therefore, meeting Criterion B is possible via six different ways. 
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Similarly, Criterion C is subdivided thusly: 1) self-reported history does not reflect documented 
history, 2) self-reported symptom endorsement is inconsistent with known patterns of brain 
functioning, 3) self-reported symptoms are inconsistent with current behavior, 4) self-reported 
symptoms are inconsistent with report from collateral contacts, or 5) there is evidence of 
symptoms exaggeration or fabrication on “well-validated” self-report measures. 
The term definite MND refers to meeting A, B1 (below chance performance on 
neuropsychological testing), and D criteria. Meeting the classification criteria for probable 
malingering can be done in two ways. In both cases, the individual must have a substantial 
external incentive to appear impaired (Criterion A) and the findings from Criterion B and C are 
not secondary to known bonafide disorders (Criterion D). In the first case, a probable malingerer 
also meets two or more criteria from any one of B1-B6. In the second case, a probable 
malingerer also meets one criterion from neuropsychological testing (any of B1-B6) and one 
from self-report testing (any of C1-C5). The third, and least stigmatizing level of malingering, 
possible, is described as initially meeting Criterion A. Then, the individual must demonstrate at 
least any one of Criterion C level evidence and either the Criterion C behaviors meet Criterion D 
or criteria for definite or probable MND is met except that the behaviors in question may be 
partially explained by an actual disorder (Criterion D). While the diagnostic criteria is more 
liberal when applying a malingering label according to the Slick et al. (1999) criteria as one 
moves from definite to possible malingering, the level of certainty that an individual is really 
malingering may decrease accordingly. Additionally, if one does not meet Criterion A, but still 
satisfies all or part of Criteria B or C, the validity and credibility of performance would be called 
into question, but the person would not be labeled as a malingerer, but likely a factitious disorder 
instead. 
Despite obtaining a high level of certainty of determining MND, undesirable and  
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unintended consequences are likely to occur as a result of labeling (Murphy, 1976; 
Thornicroft, Rose, Kassam, & Sartorius, 2007), especially when one is labeled a malingerer 
(Szasz, 1956). For instance, the dangers of mislabeling someone as a malingerer may include 
losing legitimate workers’ compensation, disability, pensions, accommodations, needed 
healthcare services, or loss of liberty (Yelin, 1986). Furthermore, once that label has been 
applied, any future medical or legal claims made by the individual will likely be skeptically 
viewed. Consequently, using the term malingering in clinical settings is disfavored by many 
neuropsychologists (Slick, Tan, Strauss, & Hultsch, 2004). Rather, when clinicians are 
confronted with poor effort consistent with MND, they tend to indicate that test results are 
invalid, are inconsistent with the severity of the injury, that the results are indicative of 
exaggeration, or are noncredible (Boone, 2007b; Slick et al., 2004). In following that line of 
thinking against undue stigmatization, research and clinical practice recommendations in this 
field of study stress avoiding false positive findings of noncredible performance to avert 
subjecting clients to potentially harmful consequences (Bush et al., 2005).  
Methods of Detecting Noncredible Neurocognitive Performance 
 As the study of malingering has evolved, so too have the methods of detecting invalid 
performance on psychological tests. There are several methods of evaluating malingered 
performance including behavioral observations, statistical techniques, qualitative analyses, and 
clinical records review among others. There are also specialized instruments to detect such 
performance. Specialized instruments usually represent techniques including symptom validity 
testing, performance curve, atypical performance on tests, floor effects methods, and validity 
indices. While those malingering-specific tests represent a unique class of instruments designed 
for a single purpose, there has also been an effort to detect noncredible performance indirectly, 
utilizing widely used neuropsychological measures.  
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Determining the usefulness of this indirect approach requires investigation of how the 
procedures perform in disparate samples across settings. Just as there is no single, sufficient 
method or technique for detecting noncredible cognitive performance in a given case, there is no 
uniformly agreed upon statistical or methodological procedure for establishing the usefulness of 
the various techniques. Rather, most researchers use multiple strategies (Ashendorf, O'Bryant, & 
McCaffrey, 2003; Bush et al., 2005; Iverson & Binder, 2000; Nies & Sweet, 1994) that have 
been established by how well they identify individuals from known groups of noncredible 
responders. In this manner, tests and measures used to identify noncredible responding are held 
to the same standards as measures used to document the claimant’s impairments and disability. 
Therefore, classification and error rates of psychological procedures must also be reported to 
demonstrate test effectiveness (Gouvier, 1999, 2001; Gouvier, Hayes, & Smiroldo, 1998). The 
emphasis in this line of research is as much on the performance of the instruments as it is on the 
persons who complete them. 
Consequently, evaluation of diagnostic prediction in this research area generally follows 
methods applied to the usefulness of medical tests that account for the sensitivity and specificity 
of tests (Baldessarini, Finklestein, & Arana, 1983). Whereas sensitivity refers to the ability of a 
measure to accurately detect true cases of a phenomenon, specificity is concerned with the ability 
of an instrument to accurately detect true non-cases. For instance, a test that correctly identifies 
all cases of a condition and does not identify any individual without the condition as having the 
condition, has perfect sensitivity (100% or 1.00) and specificity (100% or 1.00).  
Accordingly, a test that deviates from perfect sensitivity and specificity results in 
incorrect classification of those who actually have the condition and those not having the 
condition. For illustration, if a test developed for early cancer detection had a sensitivity of .95 
and specificity of .60, it would fail to detect cancer in 5% of those that actually have cancer 
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(false negatives) and would detect cancer in 40% of those who do not have the cancer (false 
positives). Therefore, a test with high sensitivity and low specificity would be sure to “catch” the 
condition early in most cases, but would also suggest cancer was present in those who actually 
do not have cancer, resulting in a test that “cries wolf” more often than it misses true cases. 
While such a scenario for a test may be desirable in some cases, such as making sure to identify 
life-threatening conditions early in the disease process, it may not be appropriate when there are 
notable negative consequences for those misidentified as having the conditions (i.e., tissue 
biopsies, quarantine, etc.). In the case of being labeled a malingerer, researchers have generally 
assumed that a 90% specificity level is appropriate to avoid undue stigmatization and other 
undesirable social and economic consequences (Babikian, Boone, Lu, & Arnold, 2006; Bianchini 
et al., 2001), but others consider a 10% false positive rate far too high (Langeluddecke & Lucas, 
2004). 
However, sensitivity and specificity are not the only values to consider when determining 
the usefulness of a test. Several commentators have emphasized that the effectiveness of a test 
also lies in its ability to improve diagnostic decision across varying base rates (Baldessarini et 
al., 1983; Bar-Hillel & Hogarth, 1990; Faust & Nurcombe, 1989; Gouvier, 1999, 2001; Gouvier 
et al., 1998) because the confidence of diagnostic decisions are dramatically influenced by the 
proportion of the population that presently has a condition. When sensitivity, specificity, and 
condition base rate are all considered in individual cases, decisions can reflect the degree of 
probability that a condition is present when a test indicates it is present (positive predictive 
values) and the probability of the condition not being present, as indicated by the test (negative 
predictive value). For example, in low base rate conditions, even tests with high specificity and 
sensitivity values may not improve accuracy over decisions grounded in base rates alone. 
Therefore, if sensitivity and specificity values have been established, test effectiveness, in terms 
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of positive and negative predictive values, can be calculated for a number of hypothetical base 
rate conditions. In this way, metrics are created that provide a level of probability indicating a 
given condition is or is not present depending upon a test finding. Therefore, research in the 
MND arena often contains values relating to diagnostic accuracy in order to demonstrate test 
effectiveness.  
In the following section, the author briefly describes some of the specialized measures to 
detect malingering and then discusses empirically derived adaptation of traditional 
neuropsychological testing to that end. Throughout that discussion the reader is reminded that the 
phrase “well-validated” malingering instrument has a variety of meanings depending on the 
intentions and skepticism of the user (Green, 2007). Nevertheless, clinical usage of the 
procedures is informed by values supportive of diagnostic utility and effectiveness. 
Symptom Validity Testing 
 Symptom Validity Testing is a methodology utilizing tests with forced-choice response 
formats (i.e., True/False, Multiple Choice) with responses representing unambiguously correct or 
incorrect answers. Since the early work of Hiscock and Hiscock (1989), adapted from Pankratz, 
Fausti, and Peed (1975) and Pankratz’s (1979) procedures and methodology to identify 
conversion symptoms, symptom validity testing has held platinum status as the only certain way 
to identify MND (Bianchini et al., 2001). This set of procedures is founded on the statistical 
principle that an individual, given the opportunity to respond in a forced-choice format, should 
not respond incorrectly to more items than would be expected from random chance responding at 
the p < .05 level. If an individual does respond below the level predicted by chance, then it is 
thought that performance surely indicates a deliberate (or definite) attempt to respond incorrectly 
(Reynolds, 1998; Slick et al., 1999). However, below chance performance is rare in cases of 
known MND and most likely found in those making unsophisticated attempts at feigning. It is 
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known to be especially sensitive to coaching as a preventative intervention (for a discussion see 
Boone, 2007b; Youngjohn, 1995). Thus more sophisticated or idiosyncratic attempts at feigning  
likely go unidentified if relying solely on this type of testing. 
Interpretation of symptom validity test performance can also be conducted to consider  
low performance that is not below chance levels, but is below performance of individuals with 
known neurocognitive dysfunction (Binder, 1993). Through this approach, it is possible to make 
inferences regarding clinically meaningful low performance by establishing optimal critical 
cutoff scores that differentiate those with established impairments and those displaying 
malingered/noncredible performance. By using those scores, tests can then be investigated 
according to their level of classification accuracy based on a number of factors. Such symptom 
validity tests include the Test of Memory Malingering (Tombaugh, 1997), Victoria Symptom 
Validity Test (Slick, Hopp, Strauss, & Spellacy, 1996), and Portland Digit Recognition Test 
(Binder, 1993). 
Performance Curve, the Floor Effect, and Atypical Performance 
 Most neuropsychological and cognitive tests contain a collection of items and procedures 
that vary in degree of complexity and difficulty (Lezak, Howieson, Loring, Hannay, & Fischer, 
2004). This is particularly true of standardized achievement and intellectual functioning 
measures (Wechsler, 1997a; Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001) as well as specialized 
neuropsychological instruments (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Many of those tests tend to 
have easy items at the beginning of sets and conclude with more difficult items. Thus, the 
examiner can expect typical clients to miss progressively more items toward the latter portion of 
tests, rather than observing the opposite pattern. If the level of difficult items passed exceeds an 
expected level relative to easier items, then inferences can be made regarding the level of effort 
during testing (Rogers, 1997). Procedures using this rationale include the Dot Counting Test 
12 
(Rey, 1941), Validity Indicator Profile (Frederick, 1997), as well as qualitative analyses of 
performance (Johnstone & Cooke, 2003). 
 The easiest items of a neuropsychological test identify the “floor” or the most basic level 
of abilities measured by a test. Therefore, most individuals can be expected to complete them 
correctly at an exceptionally high rate. Similarly, tests of noncredible performance have been 
developed that appear difficult, but are actually quite simple with successful performance 
requiring a low level of cognitive skill. On such tasks (e.g., Rey 15-Item Test; Rey, 1941) even 
individuals who have sustained significant levels of acquired brain injury, experience pain, or are 
poorly educated perform well. If an individual does perform poorly on those items or tests, 
especially when compared to groups of neurologically compromised individuals, poor effort is 
suspected. 
 Related to floor effect and performance curve methods, the atypical performance methods 
rely on extant knowledge of brain functioning to identify noncredibility. One of the assumptions 
about memory functioning is that it is easier to recognize learned information than it is to retrieve 
learned information in a free-recall format (Binder, Villanueva, Howieson, & Moore, 1993). 
Given this general finding, it is unexpected that an individual’s level of ability to recognize 
recently learned information is compromised relative to free-recall regardless of the level of 
neurological insult. Therefore, one would not expect to obtain results suggesting poorer 
recognition memory as opposed to recall memory. Moreover, recent investigations by Hilsabeck, 
LeCompte, Marks, and Grafman (2001) have capitalized on the findings that implicit memory 
remains largely intact even in amnesic patients. As a result, failure to learn and remember 
implicit information raises suspicion of suboptimal effort. Another method involves examining 
the differences between attention and memory performance under the assumption that attentional 
resources are required for learning and remembering information (Butters, Salmon, Cullum, & 
13 
Cairns, 1988). Therefore, poor attention relative to memory performance is also a marker for 
poor effort (Hilsabeck et al., 2003; Mittenberg, Azrin, Millsaps, & Heilbronner, 1993). Lastly, 
auditory attention span also remains relatively uncompromised by a host of neurological insults 
such as amnesia (Baddeley & Warrington, 1970), dementia (Carlesimo, Fadda, Lorusso, & 
Caltagirone, 1994), or pain (Wade & Hart, 2002), which also makes that area of functioning an 
attractive addition to malingering investigation (Greiffenstein et al., 1994).  
Validity Indices 
 Conventionally, the use of validity indices has referred to a set of internal scales of a test 
for assessing the consistency, reliability, and honesty of performance. This type of approach is 
most often used in self-report personality tests or questionnaires to ensure that individuals have 
responded consistently to items with similar content (Morey, 1991; Tellegen et al., 2003). 
However, other types of invalid responses include endorsing more severe symptoms than those 
with demonstrated physical or psychological problems, denying common problems that most 
people admit to experiencing, or reporting extremely bizarre or infrequent symptoms suggestive 
of fabrication. It is assumed that the validity indices of self-report inventories add information 
regarding a respondent’s response style, which can be utilized to make inferences regarding the 
manner in which they report psychological matters in general (i.e., under- or over-endorsement). 
For instance, if an individual endorsed a higher number of items on a scale developed to assess 
an exaggerated or negative impression (extreme or bizarre symptoms), then it is expected the 
individual responded to many other items in that manner, thus presenting a biased view of their 
current psychological status. The idea of including validity indices in neuropsychological tests 
has also received empirical attention (Boone, 2007b) as has the inclusion of indices on self-
report measures to detect malingered cognitive status (Larrabee, 1998, 2003b). 
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The Use of Standardized Neuropsychological Measures in Malingering Detection 
 Neuropsychological instruments provide quantitative and qualitative data regarding 
particular domains of cognitive functioning (Mitrushina, Boone, Razani, & D'Elia, 2005; Strauss, 
Sherman, & Spreen, 2006). Most traditional neuropsychological measures are developed to 
primarily survey singular cognitive domains (Lezak et al., 2004). For example, the Rey Auditory 
Verbal Learning Test (Rey, 1964) was developed to assess learning and memory for orally 
presented words. In addition to unidimensionally focused tests, instruments containing multiple 
subtests assessing several cognitive domains, such as intelligence tests and executive functioning 
tests (Delis et al., 2001; Wechsler, 1997a), are typically administered to derive a profile of 
cognitive strengths and weaknesses across mental abilities. Patterns of performance on such tests 
have been examined for their use in detecting noncredible performance. Those investigations 
have usually been validated against criteria derived according to the principles mentioned above 
(i.e., atypical response patterns, deviation from known brain functioning, etc.). 
There are several reasons for including validity indices derived from existing measures of 
neurocognitive ability. Using standard neuropsychological tests to glean information regarding 
individuals’ effort level decreases administration time of testing batteries when administration of 
additional validity measures might be unduly burdensome. One reason that time is a limiting 
factor to consider in clinical practice is that administration of a neuropsychological battery often 
requires a significant commitment (several hours). This is a potential burden for both the 
clinician and client. The evaluation process can be extended substantially with the addition of 
standalone validity tests; thus, having “built in” validity measures can decrease the time of test 
administration. This is important because in order for results of psychological testing and 
neuropsychological procedures to be useful, they generally require patience, attention, 
cooperation, and sometimes endurance (Johnson, Lange, DeLuca, Korn, & Natelson, 1997; 
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Lezak et al., 2004) on the part of the client, all of which can be negatively affected by extended 
testing. For example, one widely used validity measure, the Portland Digit Recognition Test 
(Binder & Willis, 1991), requires roughly 45 minutes to complete in a forensic 
neuropsychological evaluation that typically requires over a day of testing. 
Beyond the fact that testing can cause fatigue and may be aversive to the client, 
professional and market pressures require time efficient evaluations. For example, third party 
reimbursement for additional validity testing is unlikely (Piotrowski, Belter, & Keller, 1998), 
even for government mandated disability evaluations (such as in Louisiana), which makes it 
unlikely that validity tests are given in the majority of cases (Chafetz, Abrahams, & Kohlmaier, 
2007). While approximately 79% of surveyed “expert” clinical neuropsychologists in North 
America commonly use at least one validity measure (Slick et al., 2004), the percentage used by 
other practicing psychologists is unknown, but is likely less. In fact, Sharland and Gfeller (2007) 
conducted a more recent survey of clinical neuropsychologists and reported that only 24.9% 
always, 30.7% often, and 28.6% sometimes include some type of validity measure in a 
neuropsychological evaluation. This is potentially problematic given the high rates of suspected 
noncredibility across settings, as testing effort and financial incentives have been shown to 
account for significant variance in neuropsychological test performance (Binder & Rohling, 
1996; Green, Rohling, Lees-Haley, & Allen, 2001). 
Moreover, validity markers within a given test can allow more sophisticated inferences 
made about performance on that test (Mathias, Greve, Bianchini, Houston, & Crouch, 2002). For 
instance, when conducting retrospective chart reviews where no specialized validity testing was 
administered, the reviewer can calculate and use derived validity index scores to infer effort 
level, which is often necessary in forensic cases. Despite the advantages of using embedded 
measures of validity, they remain among the least used validity detection methods by 
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neuropsychologists when making a decision of noncredibility and many neuropsychologists do 
not even know about them (Sharland & Gfeller, 2007). Regardless, developing indicators of 
noncredibility for popular multiscale intelligence and memory tests has received considerable 
research attention.  
Embedded Validity Indicators 
The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997a), 
Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997b), and earlier versions of 
those tests (WAIS-R/WMS-R; Wechsler, 1981, 1987), are among the most popular adult 
intelligence and memory tests used by psychologists and neuropsychologists (Archer, 
Buffington-Vollum, Stredny, & Handel, 2006; Lees-Haley, Smith, Williams, & Dunn, 1996). 
Additionally, the WAIS-III is the most commonly administered measure by clinical 
neuropsychologists with the WMS-III closely following as the second most used (Rabin, Barr, & 
Burton, 2005). Therefore, developing embedded detection methods and noncredibility indices in 
these two instruments has the potential to add meaningful information to routine evaluations 
given such wide popularity and test usage patterns. 
Several attempts have been made to use aspects of those measures for detecting 
noncredible responses. Within that area of study, researchers have outlined how those embedded 
approaches may be used in order to meet requirements for specific level(s) of evidence (Criterion 
B) according to the Slick et al. (1999) criteria (Bianchini et al., 2001; Etherton, Bianchini, 
Heinly, & Greve, 2006; Larrabee, 2007a; Millis, 2004). Data regarding performance and 
classification accuracy of derived measures have been reported across multiple clinical, 
experimental, and normative samples.   
Digit Span Measures 
 For ease of review, selected embedded digit span indices with corresponding diagnostic  
17 
statistics across research studies are presented in Table 1. As noted above, auditory attentional 
span remains relatively spared in individuals with a range of neurological problems (Wilde, 
Strauss, & Tulsky, 2004). Given that finding, suspicion of noncredibility is raised when 
individuals perform very poorly on measures of that ability. While there are several tests 
available to assess auditory attentional span via a digit repetition method (Benton, Sivan, 
Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1994; Randolph, 1998), they all generally require participants to 
repeat increasingly longer strings of numbers that the examiner presents verbally. Examination 
of noncredible behavior using digit span tests has followed several lines of study as researchers 
have investigated a wide variety of particular types of performance including those based on age-
corrected scaled scores, digit span forward, digit span backward, maximum digit span forward, 
maximum digits backward, time to complete single trials, total number of digits completed, digit 
span performance in relation to other subtest performance, and maximum length of consistently 
accurate performance, a.k.a. reliable digit span (Reliable Digits) (Babikian & Boone, 2007). 
Since digit span performance is assessed by the WAIS-R, WAIS-III, and WMS-III, the 
majority of malingering research applications of digit span has been conducted using those 
measures. The administration, scoring, and response formats for those tests is very similar 
between the older and newer versions, and the current WAIS-III/WMS-III versions of the Digit 
Span subtests are identical to one another. Therefore, findings from early research are readily 
generalizable to those measures.  
In this section, the author reports research regarding each of the well-studied digit span 
methods in turn. Throughout the literature, researchers’ methodologies and sample 
characteristics vary from using unselected patients, patients displaying known noncredible 
performance, undergraduates who received instructions to malinger their performance, 
community control samples, and/or those with acquired brain injuries. Although some 
18 
researchers have examined many of the digit span indices in isolation, others have also taken a  
broader glance at how they perform together in terms of classification rates for MND. 
Digit Span Age-Corrected Scaled Scores. In relation to college students instructed to 
perform their best, participants instructed to malinger have shown lower age-corrected scaled 
scores on the Wechsler Digit Span subtest (Bernard, 1990; Heaton, Smith, Lehman, & Vogt, 
1978). Early classification studies of age-corrected scaled scores began with undergraduate 
analogue malingering research studies reported by Iverson and Franzen (Iverson, 1991; 1994). In 
their comparison of head injured and memory impaired patients (n = 28), simulating college 
students (n = 21), and simulating inmates (n = 35), a 1% false positive rate (misidentifying 
nonmalingerers as malingerers) was found for age-corrected scaled scores < 4 and a 2% false 
positive rate was found for scores < 5. Correct classification rates for malingerers were 82.5% 
and 90% respectively. Mean scores per group were as follows: simulating college students (M = 
2.3, SD = 1.9), simulating inmates (M = 3.1, SD = 1.4), and the neurological patients (M = 8.3, 
SD = 2.3). Additional control groups with students (n = 21) and inmates (n = 38) resulted in 
normative performance for both groups (students, M = 10.7, SD = 1.8; inmates, M = 10.7, SD = 
2.5). Iverson and Franzen (1996) also used a cutoff score of < 4 resulting in a 77.5% sensitivity 
and specificity of 100% for identifying simulated malingering in psychiatric patients (n = 20; M 
= 2.64, SD = 1.42) and simulating college students (n = 20; M = 2.8, SD = 2.59) as well as a 
control group of clinical noncompensation seeking neurological patients (n = 20; M = 8.15, SD = 
2.83) instructed to give their best effort. Orey, Cragar, and Berry (2000) have also shown that 
simulating college students generally perform approximately one standard deviation below the 
normative standard (M = 7.92, SD = 2.92). 
More recently, Vickery et al. (2004) assigned participants, from a sample of 46 
individuals with demonstrated moderate to severe traumatic brain injury (M-STBI), to two 
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25 
groups. One M-STBI group was instructed to malinger on neuropsychological testing (n = 23) 
and one M-STBI group served as a control group (n = 23). Another sample of 46 community 
volunteers was matched to the M-STBI group on the basis of demographics and they were also 
assigned to either a simulation experimental group (n = 23) or a control group (n = 23). To 
increase the external validity of the experiment, the authors provided financial incentives for 
compliance with the instructional sets. In the context of other neuropsychological measures, the 
simulating M-STBI group had significantly lower age-corrected scaled scores (M = 7.7,  
SD = 2.3) than the control M-STBI group (M = 8.3, SD = 2.4). They also reported that a group of 
simulating community malingerers performed at similar low levels (M = 7.4, SD = 2.2) to the M-
STBI malingerers, and well below community control volunteers (M = 10.9, SD = 3.2).  
 Other researchers have focused on reporting mean scores and classification accuracy 
rates in groups of clinical patients suspected of providing noncredible performance. In a 
preliminary study, Rawling and Brooks (1990) reported data on 16 severe cases of head injury 
contrasted with a “simulation” group consisting of 16 matched patients with mild traumatic brain 
injury (MTBI) suspected of feigning. Descriptive results from a full neuropsychological 
evaluation were provided. Based on those data, though no formal statistics were conducted, digit 
span appeared to be the lowest performed subtest from the WAIS-R that separated the groups 
with patients showing poor effort scoring lower than even the severely injured patients. While 
they described a follow-up validation study with additional patients, they did not report WAIS-R 
subtest information regarding those other patients.  
Trueblood and Schmidt (1993) used a Digit Span age-corrected scaled score cutoff of < 7 
when differentiating MTBI malingerers (n = 8; based on the Hiscock & Hiscock [1989] symptom 
validity test), a group of MTBI patients with questionable validity (n = 8), and two matched 
groups of nonmalingering MTBI patients (G1 n = 8, G2 n = 8). Their report of mean performance 
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is as follows: MTBI malingerers (M = 5.9), MTBI patients with questionable validity (M = 5.8), 
and the two MTBI control groups (MG1 = 8.9, MG2 = 10.8). In calculating operating 
characteristics from their study, sensitivity was 62.5%, and specificity remained high at 99% 
(one false positive). They also reported a 14.9% false positive rate (85% specificity) for an ill-
defined mixed clinical group (n = 74), but no additional data were provided from that portion of 
their study. Trueblood (1994) later indicated that a cutoff of < 7 resulted in 86% specificity in 
two matched clinical control groups (n = 22; MG1 = 8.3, MG2 = 10.5). There was a 75% 
sensitivity for clients in a known clinical malingering group (n = 12, M = 4.8; based on the 
Hiscock & Hiscock [1989] symptom validity test). That score also identified 8 of 10 clients with 
questionably valid performance whose mean digit span scaled score was 5.6. One substantial 
limitation of Trueblood’s (1994) study is that there was no information regarding neurological 
status any of the samples. 
Two other studies reported group scaled score means for the Digit Span subtest. 
Youngjohn, Burrows, and Erdal (1995) reported that the Digit Span scaled score (M = 8.71, SD = 
3.21) and Digit Symbol scaled score (M = 8.60, SD = 2.52) from subtests of the WAIS-R 
represented the lowest subtests scores for a group of MTBI patients with persisting symptoms 
seeking compensation (n = 55). No control or comparison groups were examined and no data 
regarding symptom validity tests or other validity measures were provided. Suhr, Tranel, Wefel, 
and Barrash (1997) reported digit span scaled score mean performance for a MTBI probable 
malingering group in litigation (n = 31; based on the Hiscock & Hiscock [1989] symptom 
validity test), a MTBI litigation control group (n = 30; nonmalingering), and a MTBI control 
group not in litigation (n = 20). Again, Digit Span performance was lowest in the malingering 
group (M = 6.3, SD = 2.4), but remained within normal limits for the litigating MTBI controls (M 
= 9.1, SD = 2.7) and nonlitigating MTBI controls (M = 9.0, SD = 3.0). They also included Digit 
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Span data from other small nonlitigating clinical control patients who endured severe head injury 
(n = 15, M = 9.5, SD = 2.8), were diagnosed with depression (n = 30; M = 8.7, SD = 2.9), or had 
significant somatic complaints (n = 29; M = 8.9, SD = 3.4). However, neither Youngjohn et al. 
(1995) nor Suhr et al. (1997) provided information regarding classification accuracy related to 
their Digit Span findings. 
In more recent research, Heinly, Greve, Bianchini, Love, and Brennan (2005) reported 
mean values for digit span scaled scores in a mixed group of TBI patients with mild to severe 
injury. Slick et al.’s (1999) criteria (Slick Criteria) were applied to all patients utilizing the Test 
of Memory Malingering, Portland Digit Recognition Test, California Verbal Learning Test, 
unique responses to tests, and Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – Second Edition as 
evidence for MND. The groups consisted of patients with no incentive to malinger (n = 45, M = 
10.48, SD = 3.76), non-MND patients with only incentive to malinger (n = 101; M = 9.74, SD = 
2.88), suspected malingerers (n = 127; M = 8.40, SD = 2.60), probable malingerers (n = 53; M = 
6.65, SD = 2.34), and those meeting Slick Criteria for definite MND (n = 12; M = 6.13, SD = 
2.80). Sensitivity was low at 36%, but specificity 93% was excellent for Digit Span scaled scores 
< 5 in comparing the entire TBI group with TBI patients determined to be malingerers. They also 
indicated that, in a 20% base rate condition, a score of < 5 was associated with a 56% positive 
predictive power. Their findings also revealed that scaled scores of < 5 were associated with 
more false positives in patients who were elderly, had endured a cerebrovascular accident (14% 
false positive rate), had substantiated severe memory disorders (10% false positive rate), were 
diagnosed with a psychiatric condition (7% false positive rate), or had a diagnosis other than TBI 
(10% false positive rate). 
 Babikian, Boone, Lu, and Arnold (2006) utilized a known groups design based on Slick 
Criteria to investigate the classification accuracy in a mixed group of litigating psychiatric and 
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neuropsychological patients with documented noncredible neuropsychological performance (n = 
66). They used a combination of several validity measures to satisfy Slick Criteria including the 
Dot Counting Test, Rey Word Recognition Test, b test, Word Memory Test, Rey’s 15-item test, 
and the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test. They also used data from a clinical 
neuropsychological control sample (n = 56) and nonclinical control sample (n = 32). The group 
with noncredible performance was the worst among the groups on the Digit Span subtest (M = 
6.2, SD = 3.1) with the clinical (M = 8.8, SD = 2.8) and non-clinical controls (M = 9.42, SD = 
2.20) scoring higher. Investigation of Digit Span subtest of < 4 resulted in nearly perfect 
specificity, but the cutoff score resulted in poor sensitivity (32%). However, when raised to < 5, 
specificity was within an acceptable range (93% for clinic patients), while raising sensitivity 
(42%) resulting in a positive predictive power of 51% in a 15% base rate condition. 
Greve et al. (2007) examined Digit Span age-corrected scaled scores in a sample of 
litigating patients claiming injuries secondary to toxic chemical exposure. They further 
subdivided this group into a MND group (n = 46) based on Slick Criteria, an indeterminate group 
comprised of those failing only one validity index (n = 39), and a nonmalingering group (n = 38). 
They used multiple possible combinations across the Word Memory Test, Test of Memory 
Malingering, Portland Digit Recognition Test, Computerized Assessment of response Bias, 
California Verbal Learning Test, General Memory Index minus Attention/Concentration Index, 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–Second Edition, and Processing Speed Index to 
classify individuals according to the Slick Criteria. Based on that classification, they reported 
that the MND group (M = 6.56, SD = 2.71) scored lower than both the indeterminate group  
(M = 8.09, SD = 2.21) and the clinical toxic claimant controls (M = 9.08, SD = 1.86). While 
specificity of digit span age-corrected scaled scores < 4 was 100%, sensitivity was poor (22%). 
When the cutoff score was raised to < 5, specificity was held at an acceptable level (93%) and 
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sensitivity was raised to 46%, which resulted in a 59% positive predictive power at a 20% base 
rate. The level of Digit Span scaled score performance of < 5 was associated with only a 36% 
sensitivity and 97% specificity for differentiating MTBI and TBI groups from a known 
malingering group (Axelrod, Fichtenberg, Millis, & Wertheimer, 2006). 
Beyond clinical and experimental studies of digit span age-corrected scaled scores, 
Iverson and Tulsky (2003) examined the WAIS-III/WMS-III standardization sample to 
investigate base rates of low performance in the general population. Delineated by age bands, 
they indicated that the cumulative percent of scaled scores < 4 in 1,000 young persons (ages 16-
34) was 2.2%, and remained low at 4.7% with a score of < 5. Moreover, only 3.4% of those 
diagnosed with a significant neurological condition (n = 123; TBI, Korsakoff’s syndrome, 
Alzheimer’s disease, temporal lobectomy, chronic alcoholism) reported in the technical manual 
had a score < 5 with an average score of 10.1 (SD = 2.8). 
Despite few false positives in neurologically impaired groups, Graue et al. (2007) called 
into question using the digit span age-corrected scaled scores (< 5) procedure in individuals with 
impaired intellectual functioning (Fullscale Intelligence Quotient [FSIQ] < 70) by conducting a 
study of community volunteers. The first group served as a community control group with low 
average intellectual functioning (n = 10; FSIQ M = 80.2) and the second community group  
(n = 25; estimated FSIQ M = 82.1) was instructed to simulate mental retardation on a number of 
tests including the WAIS-III. The control group was recruited from a local agency providing 
services to individuals diagnosed with mental retardation (n = 26; FSIQ M = 60). Graue et al 
(2007) compared groups based on a number of derived validity indices from the WAIS-III, 
including age-corrected scaled score. Results indicated that the mental retardation simulation 
group (M = 4.6, SD = 1.8) performed similarly to those diagnosed with mental retardation (M = 
4.5, SD = 1.7) for age-corrected scores. As a result, the sensitivity (68%) and specificity (19%) 
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were poor in discriminating the groups. These data support other recent work showing specificity 
(81%) for scaled scores < 5 in a mixed group of patients with low intellectual functioning (n = 
63, FSIQ < 79) who had no incentive to feign (Dean, Victor, Boone, & Arnold, 2007). If fact, 
Dean et al. (2007) reported a 33% specificity level for that cutoff score in individuals with FSIQ 
scores ranging from 50-69. Consequently, while research generally supports the use of scaled 
scores < 5 as an acceptable cutoff score for identifying those giving poor effort, that score is not 
appropriate to use with those who have intellectual disabilities.  
Reliable Digit Span (Reliable Digits). Greiffenstein et al. (1994) developed the Reliable 
Digits technique to optimally identify individuals with invalid performance. The authors 
described the technique as follows: addition of the longest string of repeated digits with no error 
over two trials in both forward and backward conditions. In their landmark study, the authors 
studied a group largely composed of litigating patients referred by insurance companies and 
attorneys claiming TBI deficits. They examined three groups: a TBI patient group (n = 33), 
persistent postconcussion group (n = 30), and a malingering persistent postconcussion group  
(n = 43). They identified the probable malingering group according to improbable performance 
on two or more measures, disability in their social role, contradicting collateral reports and 
symptom history, and remote memory loss. They reported that the malingering group performed 
significantly lower (M = 6.7, SD = 1.2) than both the persistent postconcussion control group (M 
= 8.9, SD = 1.1) and TBI control group (M = 8.8, SD = 1.2). They also reported choosing a cutoff 
score based on performance -1.3 standard deviations in the TBI group (< 7). Their cutoff resulted 
in 70% sensitivity and 73% specificity when comparing the malingering and TBI group, while 
that score had 68% sensitivity and 89% specificity when comparing the malingering group with 
the persistent postconcussion control group. Greiffenstein et al. (1994) also reported the base rate 
for malingering was 57% among the TBI patients, and a base rate of 59% among the persistent  
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postconcussion patients. Parenthetically, these participants were nearly all referred for  
independent medical evaluations from insurance company defense attorneys. 
 Meyers and Volbrecht (1998) studied a group of patients with MTBI (n = 47) involved in 
litigation with 49 referrals from treating physicians. They classified nine litigants as malingerers 
according to a forced choice procedure. Among the nine malingerers identified, seven (77%) 
were also identified by Reliable Digits < 7, while only 5% of those with credible performance 
were misidentified as malingerers. In a later study, Meyers and Volbrecht (2003) incorporated 
Reliable Digits < 6  into a decision tree among several other validity measures in a large clinical 
sample that included 32 normal controls. While they reported classification accuracy for their 
entire battery, they did not report any data specific to failure rates of Reliable Digits nor did they 
report levels of performance on that measure. 
Larrabee (2003a) also incorporated Reliable Digits into a battery of multiple validity 
measures. He examined archival data from 24 closed head injured patients with definite MND 
(meeting Slick Criteria using the Portland Digit Recognition Test, below p < .05 level). He then 
compared that group to nonmalingering patients who suffered documented M-STBI (n = 27). 
Among other validity measures, Reliable Digits < 7 was used to differentiate the known groups. 
Reliable Digits showed a sensitivity of 50% and specificity of 93.5%. None of the control M-
STBI scored < 6, while 23.1% of the patients in the known group were identified. He then cross-
validated the findings to additional clinical groups of similarly classified known definite (n = 24; 
M = 7.37, SD = 1.92) and probable malingerers (n = 17; M = 6.82, SD = 1.67). They were 
compared to credible patients with severe TBI (M = 8.87, SD = 1.13), MTBI (M = 10.00, SD = 
2.22), mixed neurological problems (M = 10.62, 2.34), and psychiatric diagnoses (M = 9.79, SD 
= 2.33). Those credible clinical groups were not significantly different from each other according 
to Reliable Digits scores. Despite reporting classification rates according to Reliable Digits from  
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the initial study, his follow-up cross-validation report lacked those data.  
In their archival review of 151 workers’ compensation TBI referrals, Mathias et al. 
(2002) administered at least one specialized malingering instrument (i.e., Test of Memory 
Malingering, Portland Digit Recognition Test) and classified each client according to the Slick 
Criteria. They further divided the patients into a control group with no incentive to feign and did 
not meet Slick Criteria (n = 30) and into a probable MND group (n = 24). A Reliable Digits < 7 
cutscore resulted in 67% sensitivity and 93% specificity with 68% positive predictive power and 
91% negative predictive power in a 20% base rate condition. They also reported information 
about the false positive cases, and indicated both cases had severe TBI and borderline intellectual 
functioning (FSIQ < 80), suggesting increased false positives in persons with known 
neurological compromise.  
Duncan and Ausborn (2002) applied Reliable Digits to case records of adult males  
(n = 187) in a forensic sample who had no evidence of neurological dysfunction. They 
retrospectively identified each case as malingering (n = 54) or not malingering (n = 134) based 
on self reports, interview, and the Rey 15-item test. They reported the malingering group (M = 
5.81, SD = 3.40) performed lower than the credible group (M = 8.87 SD = 2.14) on Reliable 
Digits. Using Reliable Digits < 6, sensitivity of identifying malingerers was 56.6% and 
specificity was 90.3%. When raising the cutoff score to < 7, sensitivity was raised to 67.9%, but 
specificity lowered to 71.6%. 
Etherton, Bianchini, Greve, and Heinly (2005) conducted a records review of 200 pain 
patients (most of whom had a financial incentive) referred by physicians, workers’ 
compensation, and attorneys. The patients were assigned to a nonmalingering pain sample (n = 
53) if there was objective medical evidence of physiological damage associated with pain and no 
evidence of self-report symptom exaggeration or poor performance on Test of Memory 
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Malingering, Portland Digit Recognition Test, or Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – 
Second Edition. The definite MND group consisted of patients meeting Slick Criteria. They also 
used an archival sample of M-STBI patients (n = 69) with no history of noncredible behavior. A 
large portion of the M-STBI and control pain group had some sort of external incentive. The 
credible pain group (M = 10.51, SD = 2.28) and control M-STBI group (M = 10.23, SD = 2.25) 
scored significantly higher than the malingering group (M = 7.20, SD = 2.95). They reported 
37% sensitivity and 92% specificity with a 65% positive predictive power at a 20% base rate for 
Reliable Digits < 7. They further reported that scores of < 6 in M-STBI were associated with 
99% specificity.  
Heinly, Greve, Bianchini, Love, and Brennan (2005) reported Reliable Digits mean 
values for clinic data from their mixed group of TBI patients with mild to severe injury. Those 
patients with no incentive to feign (M = 9.91, SD = 2.30), non-MND patients with only incentive 
to malinger (M = 9.93, SD = 2.30), and suspected malingerers (M = 8.32, SD = 2.03) scored 
higher than probable malingerers (M = 7.15, SD = 2.02) and those meeting Slick Criteria for 
definite MND (M = 6.61, SD = 2.23). While sensitivity was low at 39%, specificity (96%) was 
excellent for Reliable Digits < 6 in comparing the total TBI group with those TBI patients 
determined to be malingerers. They also indicated that, in a 20% base rate condition, a score of < 
6 was associated with a 71% positive predictive validity (p. 441). Using their classification 
scheme, across all credible TBI patients, none scored lower than 6 on Reliable Digits (100% 
specificity). However, they also reported that a score of < 5 was associated with more false 
positives in patients who were elderly, had endured a cerebrovascular accident (14% false 
positives), had substantiated severe memory disorders (18% false positives), were diagnosed 
with a psychiatric condition (2% false positives), or had a diagnosis other than TBI (12% false 
positives). They also held that a score of < 5 was associated with a 56% positive predictive 
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validity with holding specificity to 95% in a 20% base rate condition in the credible TBI sample. 
Based on their findings, in conjunction with additional literature, they recommended that 
Reliable Digits < 7 is consistent with a negative response bias.  
 In another study Bianchini, Love, Greve, and Adams (2005) studied an archive of 11 
patients referred for neuropsychological evaluation, 10 of who were involved in workers’ 
compensation litigation. Nine of the patients met Slick Criteria for either probable or definite 
malingering. Using Reliable Digits < 6, neither of the two credible patients were misclassified, 
while 5 of the nine malingerers were correctly identified. When using Reliable Digits < 7, one 
(25%) of the credible was misclassified, and six of the nine (66%) malingerers were correctly 
identified. 
 Babikian et al. (2006) showed their noncredible performance group (based on Slick 
Criteria) scored low on Reliable Digits (M = 6.7, SD = 2.4) with the clinical (M = 8.9, SD = 2.0) 
and non-clinical controls (M = 9.28, SD = 1.61) scoring higher. Investigation of Reliable Digits 
of < 7 resulted in high 62% sensitivity and poor specificity (77% for clinical patients, 87% for 
controls). When lowered to < 6, sensitivity (45%) fell, but specificity (93%) was raised. This 
resulted in a 53% positive predictive power in a 15% base rate condition. 
Axelrod, Fichtenberg, Millis, and Wertheimer (2006) included Reliable Digits among 
several other validity measures. Archival data were analyzed from patients with documented TBI 
(n = 29), patients involved in litigation who met Slick Criteria (n = 36), and a MTBI control 
group (n = 22). Presentation of means for the groups indicated the malingering group (M = 6.3, 
SD = 2.1) performed significantly lower than the TBI (M = 8.5, SD = 2.1) and MTBI (M = 9.7, 
SD = 2.7) groups. Their study did not include classification rates for Reliable Digits. 
Greve et al. (2007) reported that those meeting Slick Criteria (M = 7.37, SD = 2.25) 
scored lower than both an indeterminate group (M = 8.10, SD = 1.55) and clinical controls (M = 
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9.47, SD = 1.74). Specificity of Reliable Digits < 7 was 89% with a sensitivity of 54%, while 
lowering the cutoff to < 6 altered the specificity to 97% and lowered sensitivity to 46%. 
However, positive predictive power was high (79%) at a 20% base rate. Thus, Greve et al. (2007) 
suggested that a score of < 7 in the presence of objective brain pathology is an equivocal 
indicator of malingering.  
In Graue et al.’s (2007) sample of feigned mental retardation, the community control 
group with low average intellectual functioning (M = 8.1, SD = 2.0) performed higher than the 
mental retardation simulation group (M = 5.9, SD = 1.7), which performed similarly to those 
diagnosed with mental retardation (M = 5.5, SD = 1.6). Classification accuracy between the 
simulated mental retardation group versus the community mental retardation group was poor 
using a cutoff of < 6 (56% sensitivity, 15% specificity). Marshall and Happe (2007) also reported 
failure rates of Reliable Digits < 7 in a sample of 100 individuals diagnosed with mental 
retardation (FSIQ M = 63, ranging from 51 to 74) having no obvious incentive to feign 
impairment. As a whole, the group scored below the Greiffenstein et al. (1994) cutscore  
(M = 5.8, SD = 1.7). Accordingly, they indicated a high false positive rate (69%) in that group, 
suggesting that this method of malingering detection is at best questionable when used with 
intellectually disabled clients. Dean et al. (2007) also reported high failure rates (33% 
specificity) of Reliable Digits < 6 in patients with FSIQ ranging from 50-69 (in the intellectually 
disabled range). However, fewer patients with IQ’s ranging from 70-79 were misidentified (81% 
specificity). 
In addition to clinical studies, experimental designs have also been used to investigate the 
utility of Reliable Digits. Strauss et al. (2002) used an experimental design to assign 74 
community recruited adults into one of three groups. The first group consisted of 27 individuals 
with a history of documented head injury (19 MTBI, 8 M-STBI), a naïve group (n = 26) 
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containing individuals without head injury history and had no professional contact with head 
injured individuals, an experienced group of patients with no history of head injury but did have 
professional contact with individuals who had experienced a head injury. Each participant was 
then assigned to one of two experimental conditions: 1) simulated malingering or 2) control 
condition. To investigate variability of performance across repeated administrations of Reliable 
Digits and other malingering instruments, all participants were tested on three occasions. They 
indicated that performance on Reliable Digits over testing trials was variable. They also 
replicated the finding that Reliable Digits performance was lower in experimental malingerers 
than controls, and this finding was robust regardless of the level of prior knowledge and 
experience with head injury. Mean Reliable Digits performance for the first testing session per 
group in the control condition ranged from 10.25 to 11.77 (SD = 2.93-2.20), while average 
malingered performance ranged from 5.60 to 6.46 (SD = 2.57-4.06). Classification accuracy for 
the use of Reliable Digits to correctly identify control participants was 90% and accuracy for the 
identified malingering participants was 79.4%. Thus, the sensitivity (47%) was poor, but 
specificity was high (95%) for Reliable Digits < 6. 
 In another experimental study, Etherton, Bianchini, Ciota, and Greve (2005), assigned 
participants to one of three conditions: controls (n = 20), those instructed to simulate memory 
impairment (n = 20), and participants completed Reliable Digits while experiencing laboratory-
induced pain (n = 20). Performance on Reliable Digits was significantly better for controls (M = 
10.65, SD = 2.33) and in the laboratory pain condition (M = 10.25, SD = 1.62) than for the 
simulation group (M = 6.25, SD = 2.73). They reported that Reliable Digits < 7 resulted in 65% 
sensitivity and 100% specificity and Reliable Digits < 9 was associated with 80% sensitivity and 
specificity. The high specificity in this group likely reflects the high level of education of their 
university sample.  
37 
Digit Span Forward and Digit Span Backward. In the Digit Span task of the WAIS-
III/WMS-III, the participant repeats the orally presented stimuli sequentially from the first 
number presented to the last. As the task progresses, each successive two-item trial is extended 
by a single digit. For example, the items are first trial of two digits in length, while the second 
trial is composed of items three digits long, and each trial increases sequentially. The total Digit 
Span forward equals the sum of the number of correctly completed trials. The test is discontinued 
when the participant misses both items of any given trial and the trial length before discontinuing 
represents the maximum digits span (forward). The methodology is the same for the backward 
span task, expect that the participant is required to repeat the digits in reverse sequential order. 
Thus, participants also obtain scores for the number of correct trials (Digit Span backward) and 
longest string of digits they are able to repeat (maximum attentional span backward). Research 
has consistently shown that participants instructed to malinger display a shortened attention span 
for repeating numbers sequentially (Iverson & Franzen, 1994, 1996; Vickery et al., 2004) and 
others have shown the same pattern in known noncredible patients (Babikian et al., 2006; Binder 
& Willis, 1991; Suhr et al., 1997). Iverson and Tulsky (2003) have reported normative 
performance of maximum attentional span forward and maximum attentional span backward 
performance and indicated that a maximum attentional span forward < 4 and maximum 
attentional span backward < 2 is rare in the general population. Heinly et al. (2005) and Babikian 
et al. (2006) also reported that maximum attentional span forward < 4 rarely occurs except for 
those with known MND. However, while the occurrence for maximum attentional span 
backward < 2 was rare in those shown not to be malingering, the rate was considerable among 
those with a documented cerebrovascular accident and memory problems. This later observation 
likely reflects the assertion that backward digit span tasks require working memory resources, 
which are often affected by those conditions (Reynolds, 1997). Despite the aforementioned 
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research with forward and backward spans, they are among the least studied measures in 
research order to establish optimal cutscores. 
Difference Score Approaches 
 Researchers have also examined feigning behavior based on current knowledge of brain 
functioning. This has led to exploring improbable test patterns to identify malingering. For 
example, recognition memory is generally superior to free-recall memory. Based on that 
knowledge, a series of early studies addressed discrepancy of patients’ performance on 
recognition versus recall (Bernard, McGrath, & Houston, 1993) and some have also examined 
discrepancy between attention/concentration and general memory performance (Hilsabeck et al., 
2003; Iverson, Slick, & Franzen, 2000; Mittenberg et al., 1993; Slick, Hinkin, van Gorp, & Satz, 
2001). Other discrepancies consist of examining domains of brain functioning that have been 
shown to remain robust following cerebral insult, such as crystallized verbal knowledge and digit 
span, with indices known to be vulnerable to disruption. This approach was first introduced by 
Wechsler (1955) in the hold-don’t hold comparisons in the original WAIS. 
Vocabulary Minus Digit Span. Mittenberg et al. (1995) first examined discrepancies 
between WAIS-R measures of verbal knowledge and Digit Span performance. This procedure 
involves subtracting the digit span age-corrected scaled scores from the scaled score of the 
Vocabulary subtest, which results in the Vocabulary minus Digit Span index. In the 1995 study, 
they compared 67 nonlitigating head injured patients to a group of adult volunteers instructed to 
malinger (n = 67) on the WAIS-R, and reported their findings in terms of Vocabulary minus 
Digits scores and associated malingering probability values. They showed that a Vocabulary 
minus Digits Span of 1.53 optimally differentiated the groups, which resulted in 70% sensitivity. 
However, they failed to report false positive rates for the control participants. Since that study, 
others have suggested using cutscores of two (> +2) (Demakis, 2004; Millis, Ross, & Ricker, 
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1998). Larger discrepancies have been associated with higher levels of diagnostic accuracy in 
identifying noncredible performance, and WAIS-III Vocabulary minus Digits discrepancy scores 
where the base rate for malingering is 20% vary accordingly (Vocabulary minus Digits = 2, 50% 
accuracy; Vocabulary minus Digits = 3, 68% accuracy; Vocabulary minus Digits = 4, 79% 
accuracy) in differentiating malingered performance (Mittenberg et al., 2001). That finding was 
also echoed by Greve, Bianchini, Mathais, Houston, and Crouch’s (2003) report that a 
Vocabulary minus Digits > 4 was associated with the highest specificity (77% to 100%), but 
lowest sensitivity (0% to 50% ) in relation to cutscores of two or three. Additionally, the rates of 
Vocabulary minus Digits > 2 in clinical groups applying for vocational assistance or disability is 
near 30% (close to the hypothetical base rate; Williams & Carlin, 1999). 
Despite the relatively good performance of Vocabulary minus Digits in differentiating 
malingering, there have been caveats issued by other research. For example, Axelrod and 
Rawlings (1999) studied archival data of three samples of cognitive rehabilitation patients with a 
documented significant TBI across multiple assessments throughout their recovery process. 
Using Vocabulary minus Digits > 2, they noted specificities of 70% in all three groups at two 
months post injury. Specificity increased to 79%, 86%, and 91% in each group at a year status 
post injury. This suggests that performance on Vocabulary minus Digits, as a validity test, may 
not be appropriate for individuals in acute recovery stages of a TBI. Marshall and Happe (2007) 
also reported that Vocabulary minus Digits is likely insensitive to invalid performance in a 
mental retardation population as their sample of intellectually disabled patients had a mean score 
of -1.03 and only two of 100 patients scored below a discrepancy of greater than two. Graue et 
al. (2007) also reported that the average individual diagnosed with mental retardation has a 
negative Vocabulary minus Digits, while those malingering mental retardation only have slightly 
positive scores. This resulted in very poor sensitivity (0%) and perfect specificity. Taken 
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together, those results suggest that Vocabulary minus Digits in low IQ groups is not vulnerable 
to malingering. However, this may be due to the fact that those with lowered intellectual 
functioning tend to demonstrate overall lowered cognitive abilities. Thus, large discrepancies 
between cognitive abilities are less likely to occur in those with intellectual disabilities as 
performance is typically uniformly lowered. 
Iverson and Tulsky (2003) further reported that difference scores (either positive or 
negative) of greater than or equal to five occur in fewer than 5% (2.5% for > +5) of the WAIS-III 
standardization sample. They also found that difference scores of 2 or more occur in 13.6% of 
the TBI group reported in the manual and 6.9% of the total clinical patients. In young persons 
(ages 16-34), 20.9% have difference scores of > 3, resulting in approximately 10% having 
positive values (Vocabulary minus Digits > +3). They also reported that approximately half of 
the patients and clinical groups had a higher Digit Span score relative to Vocabulary. In general 
then, approximately 6.9% of patients in clinical groups have scores of > 4, and 13.8% have 
values > 3. Across all age groups, nearly 20.5% have Vocabulary minus Digits > 3 (Vocabulary 
minus Digits > +3). Moreover, Mittenberg et al. (2001) also reported the Vocabulary minus 
Digits of 2, 3, and 4 resulted in correctly classifying 73.9, 82.9, and 89.8% of the WAIS-III 
standardization sample respectively. Another report by Miller, Ryan, Carruthers, and Cluff 
(2004) indicated 99% specificity for Vocabulary minus Digits > 6 in a mixed credible clinical 
sample. Therefore, a cutscore of > 3 should result in adequate specificity in the general 
population and in most clinical settings where there is little evidence for marked neurological 
problems 
Discriminant Functions 
 Mittenberg’s Discriminant Function Score (Mittenberg Index). By applying multivariate 
techniques, Mittenberg, Theroux-Fichera, Zielinski, and Heilbronner (1995) differentiated 
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groups of simulated malingerers and nonlitigating patients according to performance pattern 
across WAIS-R subtests. Their procedure resulted in a widely used and cited classification 
discriminant function score (Mittenberg Index). They reported the following equation: Digit 
Span (-.3289) + Vocabulary (.1715) + Arithmetic (-.0720) + Comprehension (-.0811) + 
Similarities (.1580) + Picture Completion (-.0799) + Digit Symbol Coding (.0780) + .9696 
(Constant). By using that combination of subtest scaled scores and derived coefficients, they 
reported that a Mittenberg Index value of > .00 resulted in 50% probability of malingering with 
the probability increasing as the value of the Mittenberg Index increases. Using the Mittenberg 
Index, they were able to obtain a 76% true positive rate. Further cross-validation work of the 
Mittenberg Index in a known malingering group and credible TBI sample showed a Mittenberg 
Index cutoff of .10536 resulted in high classification accuracy for both the TBI (92%) and 
malingering (88%) groups (Millis et al., 1998). 
 Their technique has also been further cross-validated on clinical groups using the WAIS-
III. Mittenberg et al. (2001) reported a sensitivity of 72.2% (for simulating malingerers) and 
83.3% specificity for a cutoff of > .00 as recommended by Mittenberg et al. (1995). The 
sensitivity for probable malingerers in a clinical sample was low (44.4%). Classification 
accuracy rates according to a 20% base rate across groups were reported for Mittenberg Index 
cutoff scores of .00 (51%), .10 (55%), and .20 (62%). Overall, their cross-validation supported 
use of the formula for extended application of the Mittenberg Index to the WAIS-III. 
Greve et al. (2003) further applied the Mittenberg Index to classify malingering patients. 
However, their findings suggested that Mittenberg Index > .00 resulted in poor specificity (80%), 
but was increased when the cutoff was raised to > .212 (92% to 100% for the WAIS-III). That 
more conservative cutoff resulted in adequate sensitivity (57% for the WAIS-III). In general, 
they found a higher false positive rate in their S-MTBI group than the MTBI group, suggesting 
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the Mittenberg Index is somewhat sensitive to injury severity. However, no credible patient with 
MTBI was misclassified as a malingerer based on Mittenberg Index > .00, indicating that value 
may be appropriate for patients claiming less severe cerebral impairment (as in MTBI). Their 
calculations indicated that the positive predictive power for Mittenberg Index > .00 was 44% and 
negative predictive power was 88%. However, Bianchini et al. (2005) also applied the 
Mittenberg Index to their small sample of patients claiming neurocognitive dysfunction from 
electric injury. Inspection of their classification indicated a sensitivity of 67% and perfect 
specificity for a Mittenberg Index > .00.  
 However, there may be clinical situations where use of Mittenberg Index > .00 is 
inappropriate. Axelrod and Rawlings (1999) reported that the acute recovery phase of 
rehabilitation patients may be one such instance as specificity ranged from 76% to 78% at two 
months post TBI. Nevertheless, this high false positive rate declined substantially following a 
year after injury with specificity ranging from 88% to 93%. In their analysis of patients 
diagnosed with mental retardation, Graue et al. (2007) reported the average Mittenberg Index 
was .04 (SD = .74), thus sensitivity (48%) and specificity (65%) were not optimal. In all, positive 
findings from Mittenberg Index may be more commonly found in cases of documented severe 
impairment in those experiencing acute TBI recovery and in cases with bonafide developmental 
disabilities. Therefore, cutscores should be modified based on the clinical population (> .212 for 
S-MTBI, .00-.10 for MTBI patients and groups with no suspected neurological injury). 
 Rarely Missed Index. Poor recognition memory is often associated with profile invalidity 
(Constantinou, Bauer, Ashendorf, Fisher, & McCaffrey, 2005) and not significantly related to 
MTBI or M-STBI (Fisher, Ledbetter, Cohen, Marmor, & Tulsky, 2000). To capitalize on that 
observation, researchers have recently attempted to quantify the relationship between poor 
recognition performance and atypical performance on the WMS-III. After noting unusual 
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response bias patterns on the Logical Memory Delayed Recognition portion of the WMS-III 
(Killgore & DellaPietra, 2000a), Killgore and DellaPietra (2000b) further investigated items of 
that subtest that differentiated college students instructed to feign memory impairment from an 
archival review of credible neurological patients with memory impairment. 
 Using a discriminant function analysis, they determined that raw scores on the 
dichotomous items (yes or no) 12, 16, 18, 22, 24, and 29 were rarely failed (p < .05) in naïve 
control participants and patients. Their derived equation, the Rarely Missed Index, separated the 
groups with a high degree of accuracy. The resultant equation is as follows: item 12(-22) + item 
16(55) + item 18(84) + item 22(67) + item 24(13) + item 29(7), and ranges from -22 to 226. 
Lower scores on the Rarely Missed Index were more associated with invalid performance and a 
cutoff score of < 136 accurately identified 99% of the simulated malingerers. That score also 
resulted in a 100% specificity across base rates ranging from 1% to 50% with sensitivity 
remaining high (87%) in the lowest base rate condition. 
 Since that initial study, Langeluddecke and Lucas (2004) further supported the use of the 
Rarely Missed Index in an archival clinical sample of 99 consecutive referrals with MTBI. 
Almost half (46%) were plaintiff referrals and the rest were referrals from defense attorneys. Of 
that sample 28 patients met Slick Criteria and were compared to the remainder of the control 
sample according to the Rarely Missed Index. Given the groups’ similarities (all were in 
litigation), the specificity (75%) of the Rarely Missed Index was poorer in their study with 100% 
specificity for cutoff scores < 40. However, at that substantially lower cut-off point, sensitivity 
was very low.  
In contrast, Miller, Ryan, Carruthers, and Cluff (2004) reported a 95% specificity for the 
original cutoff score in an archival sample of mixed, nonlitigating credible patients (n = 100) 
composed of various diagnostic groups (Alcohol Abuse, Polysubstance Abuse, and TBI). Two of 
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their false positive cases had been diagnosed with TBI had FSIQ scores of 81 and 91, and also 
had impaired memory performance. Another misidentified case also had low average memory 
performance. Two other false positive patients showed Vocabulary minus Digits > 3. Thus, at 
least two of the false positive cases likely showed severe memory impairment, another had low 
memory functioning, and two others displayed questionable performance based on an external 
measure. This suggests that the participants misidentified by the Rarely Missed Index were 
actually questionable false positives. There is also recent evidence to suggest that the Rarely 
Missed Index may be appropriate to use in those diagnosed with mental retardation as it has only 
a 9% false positive rate in that population (Marshall & Happe, 2007). 
Other Memory Indicators 
Langeluddecke and Lucas (2003) demonstrated that low performance on the Auditory 
Recognition-Delayed subtest from the WMS-III was sensitive to malingering in an archival 
sample of TBI participants. They subdivided their sample into a credible (n = 50) and 
malingering (n = 25) group based on the Slick Criteria. They then selected the lowest score 
obtained by the credible group as the criterion for group comparison (Auditory Recognition-
Delayed raw score < 43). This procedure resulted in 80% sensitivity and 91.8% specificity for 
the Auditory Recognition-Delayed cutoff score. Ord, Greve, and Bianchini (2007) also supported 
using cutoff scores based on the Auditory Recognition-Delayed standard scores < 75. This cutoff 
also happens to correspond with Langeluddecke and Lucas (2003), with an Auditory 
Recognition-Delayed raw score < 43 for those ages 16-54 years (Wechsler, 1997b). They 
reported 94% specificity and 68% sensitivity with that indicator based on differentiating a known 
group of MTBI patients meeting Slick Criteria from those not meeting Slick Criteria. However, 
that specificity level dropped for patients with M-STBI and history of a cerebrovascular accident 
(89%) and dementia (73%). Conceptually, those findings are buttressed by findings that the 
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Auditory Recognition-Delayed subtest scores are not significantly lowered in MTBI and S-
MTBI when compared to normal control participants (Fisher et al., 2000). Langeluddecke and 
Lucas (2003) further reported that the Logical Memory Delayed Recognition subtest (< 19) and 
Word Lists Delayed subtests (< 18) performed with similar specificity (91.7% and 96.6%, 
respectively), but differed in their sensitivity (48% and 81%, respectively). 
Langeluddecke and Lucas (2003) also utilized the same method for the Faces I subtest 
(cutoff < 24), which resulted in 32% sensitivity and 96% specificity. This was supported by 
Glassmire et al.’s (2003) findings from a simulation experiment with nonmalingering M-STBI (n 
= 35) patients and participants with no history of neurological compromise (n = 30). Participants 
instructed to malingerer were compared on the Faces I subtest and found the cutoff of < 24 
resulted in 100% specificity, but low sensitivity (33% to 63%). 
In addition to reported cutoff scores for Auditory Recognition-Delayed, Ord et al. (2007) 
also published several classification rates of other standard index scores from the WMS-III. 
Those index scores associated with > 90% specificity include the Auditory Immediate (< 80), 
Visual Immediate (< 80), Immediate Memory (< 75), Auditory Delayed (< 75), Visual Delayed 
(< 85), General Memory (< 80), and Working Memory (< 80) Indices. However, several of those 
cutscores are likely not appropriate for use with those diagnosed with neurological complications 
secondary to a cerebrovascular accident, dementia, or M-STBI as they result in a high false 
positive rate. To further investigate their classification system, they conducted a logistic 
regression using several of the indices as predictor variables and designating malingering status 
as the outcome variable. The resultant equation is as follows: Auditory Immediate(.0120) + 
Visual Immediate(-.0188) + Auditory Delayed(.0058) + Visual Delayed(-.0241) + Auditory 
Recognition-Delayed(.0001) + Working Memory(-.1169) + 10.890. From their equation, scores 
> -1.0 have a 68% sensitivity and 91% specificity, with an associated likelihood ratio of 7.6, 
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whereas scores of > -.5 are associated with 65% sensitivity and 97% specificity with a likelihood 
ratio of 21.7. Despite the well-performing equation, they recommended that clinicians identify 
noncredible performance by examining clients who score < 75 points on three or more of those 
indices to avoid false positives. Thus, their approach appears quite robust and performed well in 
their sample. This is especially the case given their groups were based on the Slick Criteria and 
each group had a similar level of injury and most of credible patients also had incentive to 
perform poorly. 
Working Memory and Processing Speed 
 Although cognitive processing speed and working memory are among the most sensitive 
brain functions to cerebral insult (Fisher et al., 2000), measures of those faculties have also been 
shown to be sensitive to noncredible performance. Several subtests from the WAIS-III/WMS-III 
assess those abilities including Digit Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Arithmetic, Digit-
Symbol Coding, Spatial Span, and Symbol Search. Across several studies of malingering 
employing both experimental and clinical malingering groups, researchers have reported 
significantly lower performance in malingering participants than nonmalingering participants. In 
particular, performance on Digit-Symbol Coding has repeatedly been low in malingering groups 
(Orey et al., 2000; Trueblood, 1994; Trueblood & Schmidt, 1993; Vickery et al., 2004; 
Youngjohn et al., 1995); however, that finding has not been universal (Rawling & Brooks, 
1990). 
In one of the earliest classification studies using thinking speed measures as markers for 
noncredibility, Trueblood (1994) reported a Digit-Symbol Coding scaled score of less than five 
(WAIS-R) was associated with 36% sensitivity and 100% specificity. Since then, others have 
reported low processing speed scores in patients displaying malingered pain behavior (Etherton, 
Bianchini, Heinly et al., 2006). Etherton et al. (2006) reported that those meeting Slick Criteria 
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for definite MND (M = 71.25, SD = 10.17) performed significantly lower on the WAIS-III 
Processing Speed Index than those with memory disorders (M = 83.24, SD = 12.82), M-STBI (M 
= 84.74, SD = 14.89), and control participants (M = 89.48, SD = 10.17). Although the 
noncredible group, as a whole, performed in the borderline impaired range of functioning, 
classification statistics from those data still revealed that a Processing Speed Index score of < 70 
had good sensitivity (63%) and borderline specificity (89%) in a mixed clinical sample (n = 121) 
containing TBI, pain, and patients with memory disorder. However, this approach to detecting 
invalid protocols is not likely indicated for use with those diagnosed with low cognitive 
functioning as in those with intellectual disabilities (Marshall & Happe, 2007). However, in 
samples with less significant cognitive dysfunction, that score would likely be appropriate and 
result in few false positives. 
 As reported above, the WMS-III Working Memory Index has also been shown to 
accurately classify those meeting Slick Criteria. Early reports of low WMS-III Working Memory 
Index scores among malingerers indicated that known probable malingerers scored nearly 18 
standard score points (1.25 standard deviations) below control participants (Mathias et al., 2002). 
Lange et al. (2006) also reported that a clinical group meeting Slick Criteria performed nearly 
one standard deviation below a nonmalingering clinical control group on the WMS-III Working 
Memory Index. In accordance with this general finding, Ord et al. (2007) reported adequate 
classification rates for using the WMS-III Working Memory Index (< 80) (94% specificity and 
68% sensitivity). Moreover, Etherton, Bianchini, Ciota, Heinly, and Greve (2006) reported a 
WAIS-III Working Memory Index  < 70 resulted in specificity ranging from 93% to 96% with 
sensitivity of 47% in a sample of MND pain patients. 
As a whole, the overwhelming focus on MND research has pertained to those seeking 
financial awards as the substantial incentive to perform poorly related to compensation for 
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alleged disability status caused by identifiable external factors. This is particularly the case 
concerning the use of the WAIS-III and WMS-III in detecting noncredible performance. 
Moreover, that research has largely pertained to comparing patients claiming significant brain 
injuries to patients with substantiated brain injury known to cause a number of functional 
impairments or comparison with patients determined to be malingering. In this regard, several of 
the aforementioned derived WAIS-III/WMS-III indices have been validated to discriminate 
patients exaggerating neurocognitive dysfunction. 
However, feigning poor psychological test performance or exaggerating symptoms in 
order to establish disability status related to less severe neurocognitive dysfunction also occurs to 
obtain other external gains (not necessarily monetary) and pertains to those with alleged 
congenital neurocognitive problems. Nevertheless, very little research on noncredible test 
performance has been conducted with samples seeking other forms of external relief to 
accommodate or relieve disadvantages associated with neurocognitive problems less dramatic 
than TBI. For example, research into noncredible performance in those with disorders of isolated 
neurocognitive deficits such as specific learning disorders (LD) or Attention-Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) has been largely neglected. In such cases, there is no party 
responsible for neurocognitive deficits that are typically diagnosed early in the developmental 
lifespan. Hence, the problems evade the attention of the legal system as there are not typically 
large monetary sums at stake for obtaining associated disability status. Be this as it may, there 
are other tangible external incentives available as a function of being diagnosed with a less 
severe neurocognitive disorders such as ADHD or LD. 
External Incentives in Educational Settings 
There are numerous conditions (physical and mental), which might place students at a 
disadvantage when performing scholastically, resulting in high rates of poor academic 
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performance, grade retention, and dropping out (U.S. Department of Education, 2005). In order 
to address such disadvantages and potential discrimination against affected individuals within 
that class, governmental authorities have drafted legislation and adopted regulations to mitigate 
disabling functional effects of numerous health and/or social conditions. This is particularly 
relevant in the university setting as there has been a significant rise in the number of adults and 
post-secondary students complaining of cognitive problems and seeking disability status 
(Nichols, Harrison, McCloskey, & Weintraub, 2002). In fact, the number of individuals between 
the ages of three and 21 receiving support from federally funded educational programs for the 
disabled has nearly doubled within the past 20 years to over 6.7 million, and 1.7 million (8.7%) 
post-secondary students were considered disabled in 2000 (U.S. Department of Education, 
2005). 
While deficits negatively impacting scholastic performance can occur from functional 
limitations caused by a number of physical disabilities, they can also be attributed to a host of 
emotional, psychological, and/or cognitive disorders. For instance, those diagnosed with 
cognitive problems (e.g., ADHD, LD) often have functional deficits in thinking skills that 
negatively impact their ability to perform academic tasks. Therefore, educational institutions 
have formed policies and procedures in accordance with governmental statutes (e.g., 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973) to  provide an accommodating environment for those with disabling 
conditions that result in specific functional deficits affecting academic performance. 
A typical component of such procedures entails providing an academic environment 
tailored to individual student needs. This often includes providing the student with extra time on 
exams and assignments, taking tests in special settings (i.e., a quiet room), providing alternative 
response formats on exams (i.e., marking multiple choices on the test form rather than a Scantron 
response sheet), provision for note-takers, or offering other allowances (Evans, Serpell, Schultz, 
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& Pastor, 2007; Hadley, 2007). While such accommodations are available for eligible students 
through educational institutions, they are also offered to qualifying individuals taking important 
examinations that serve educational, organizational, and societal gait-keeping functions (such as 
the Scholastic Assessment Test, American College Test, Graduate Record Examination, or 
professional certification or qualifying exams). Due to the importance of such exams and the 
allure of academic success, accommodations in this regard may appear desirable to any student 
who has pressure to perform well, which provides an external incentive to seek disability status.  
Another area of external incentive for those seeking to compensate for cognitive 
disabilities is obtaining medications that have been marketed to ameliorate cognitive deficits or 
improve cognitive functioning (i.e., amphetamines), especially for those with attentional 
dysfunction (Pary et al., 2002; Peterson, McDonagh, & Rongwei, 2008). In fact, prescription of 
amphetamine based psychostimulant medications (dextroamphetamine/racemic [Adderral], 
methylphenidate [Ritalin, Methylin, Concerta]) for attentional disorders (ADHD) has increased 
to high levels for students with documented attentional problems (McCabe, Teter, Boyd, & 
Guthrie, 2004). So too, non-prescription and non-medical adoption of such drugs have risen in 
normative student populations with increased levels of seeking and selling prescription 
medications for enhanced studying or recreational purposes. In fact, researchers have reported 
high rates of  students either knowing someone who was prescribed a stimulant; or had 
personally taken and/or sold one themselves (Advokat, Guidry, & Martino, 2008; Babcock & 
Byme, 2000; McCabe, Teter, & Boyd, 2006; White, Becker-Blease, & Grace-Bishop, 2006). 
Moreover, thirty-four percent of college students prescribed a medication for ADHD reported 
being solicited for their medication (Moline & Frankenberger, 2001) and this trend has been 
satirized by popular media (Parker, 2000) as well. Therefore, university students may have 
compelling external reasons for seeking a disability status related to attentional problems in order 
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to obtain stimulant medication because they expect the use of stimulant medication will improve 
academic performance and for recreational purposes. 
Thus, the potential for external gain secondary in being diagnosed with a disabling 
cognitive condition in the student population is a factor to consider when evaluating the nature 
and extent of attentional and learning complaints. This is particularly relevant as such disorders 
are often evaluated by psychologists (Crank & Deshler, 2001) employing measures with 
embedded indices shown to be sensitive to response bias and effort (see above). Despite this set 
of issues, there are currently no established measures available that have been validated to assess 
feigned deficits in ADHD assessment, and there is only one recently devised preliminary 
experimental measure to investigate effort in LD assessments (Osmon et al., 2006). 
Of the few studies that have examined this matter in students seeking evaluation, most 
have employed simulation designs and/or have used small samples. For instance, Quinn (2003) 
showed that simulators of ADHD produced higher rates of attentional complaints and diagnostic 
symptoms of ADHD on self-report measures than controls or those diagnosed with ADHD. She 
also reported that the simulated ADHD group performed substantially lower on cognitive testing 
than both the control and clinical samples. Thus, her pioneering study revealed that test 
performance characteristics of ADHD can indeed be feigned through experimental manipulation. 
Other case reports in this area have also appeared in the literature and have suggested that 
malingered ADHD may be associated with behavioral problems (Conti, 2004). 
More recently, Harrison, Edwards, and Parker (2007) examined the effects of instructions 
to feign ADHD symptoms and performance on self-report symptom inventories and measures of 
thinking speed. Similar to other simulation studies, they reported that their feigning group 
reported more symptoms than controls and a criterion clinical ADHD group. The feigning group 
also performed much lower on measures of thinking speed than the ADHD group and control 
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participants. Thus, instruments typically employed in an ADHD evaluation are sensitive to 
feigned poor performance and symptom exaggeration. Other simulation and clinical research has 
also shown that measures of thinking speed and attentional focus may be susceptible to feigned 
poor performance in typical neuropsychological evaluations (Henry, 2005; Leark, Dixon, 
Hoffman, & Huynh, 2002; Lu, Boone, Jimenez, & Razani, 2004; Willison & Tombaugh, 2006). 
In the only published account of effort specific to LD assessment, Osmon et al. (2006) 
reported preliminary validation of a specialized assessment measure. In their simulation study, 
college participants (N = 84) were assigned to one of three conditions: 1) Reading Disorder 
simulation, 2) slow thinking speed simulation, and 3) normal effort. As part of the procedures, 
participants were administered the Word Memory Test (Green, 2003), the researchers’ newly 
constructed Word Reading Test, and an estimation of intellectual functioning. The Word 
Reading Test is a computerized task developed to mimic lay persons’ conception of reading 
disorders and dyslexic conditions. For instance, participants are briefly shown a word and 
subsequently shown two more words simultaneously – one of which is the initially presented 
target word (e.g., develop) and another word (e.g., bevelop) that may be attributable to reading 
problems (p. 316). Upon presentation of the two simultaneously presented items, the participant 
is required to choose the target item presented previously. Participants’ performance on the task 
is assessed across multiple trials. Their rationale for devising this type of task was that 
individuals feigning reading problems will commonly err by choosing the non-word at a higher 
rate than those with diagnosed reading problems.  
Their results supported that hypothesis, indicating appropriate usage of the Word Reading 
Test for detecting poor performance in reading disorder evaluations. They also reported that the 
Word Memory Test, a symptom validity test, classified simulating participants at an acceptable 
rate, indicating that traditional validity measures may be appropriate for this purpose. While the 
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Osmon et al. (2006) study represents the first and only published account of LD simulation, the 
results have yet to be replicated and extended to a clinical sample. Moreover, specialized 
measures, such as the Word Reading Test, are not available for clinical use, limiting the 
applicability of their findings. Relevant to LD assessment, though, poor Word Memory 
Performance was significantly associated with decreased performance on some memory and 
intelligence measures. 
In a study of 67 consecutive referrals to a university-based psychological assessment 
clinic, Sullivan, May, and Galally (2007) investigated potential symptom exaggeration of 
students complaining of either ADHD and/or LD. They reported that 15 (22.4%) of the clients 
demonstrated failure on at least one index from the Word Memory Test, a validated measure of 
effortful responding. They also partially replicated inverse relationships between Word Memory 
Test performance and intellectual functioning in those failing the Word Memory Test. An 
inverse relationship was also demonstrated in clients who failed the Word Memory Test and the 
California Verbal Learning Test–Second Edition.  
Although that study demonstrated a high failure rate on a symptom validity test and 
showed small to moderate positive relationships with objective cognitive measures, the authors 
may not have adequately addressed a few issues in the sample. First, they implied that the clients 
had external incentive for seeking the evaluation, but did not indicate this through formal means, 
simply indicating that the potential for secondary gains (i.e., accommodation-seeking or 
medication-seeking) in the sample was “operant” (B. Sullivan, personal communication, April 
24, 2008). They also did not address the presence of pre-existing learning problems or attentional 
difficulties due to the lack of criterion control and questionable integrity of prior diagnoses. 
Moreover, the relationship between Word Memory Test performance and the cognitive measures 
was based solely on clients scoring below cutscores indicative of invalid performance, possibly 
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inflating the relationship. However, the authors only examined composite IQ scores, which likely 
masked the relationships of Word Memory performance and specific intellectual abilities (e.g., 
cognitive processing speed). Yet another weakness in the study is that only one measure of 
validity was evaluated, limiting the applicability of the findings to other established measures, 
and especially embedded indices. Lastly, the study lacked a control sample against which to 
compare the elevated failure rates of the clinical sample. 
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Purpose and Rationale 
Reports of high failure rates on validity indices has only very recently been noted in 
college samples seeking psychoeducational evaluation but standard research or clinical criteria 
for noncredible performance (i.e., Slick Criteria) have yet to be applied in such samples. While 
Sullivan et al. (2007) reported evidence of high failure rates in this population, their lack of 
reporting potential for explicit external gains limits the application of the Slick Criteria to their 
sample. Thus, reasons for the lowered performance could be due to factors other than 
malingering as outlined in the Slick Criteria (Delis & Wetter, 2007). As such, the question of 
overt medication-seeking and/or academic accommodation seeking status has not been 
investigated for its possible relationship with performance on neuropsychological tests, nor to 
validity measures embedded therein. The focus of this project was to address some of those 
concerns. 
Validity indices for the WAIS-III/WMS-III have received considerable attention and 
have been examined in simulated malingering groups, various patient groups (litigating, TBI, 
pain, etc.), and control participants. Nevertheless, the aforementioned validation studies often 
have employed small to moderate sample sizes and none have attempted to investigate 
simultaneously several validity indices from both the WAIS-III and WMS-III in the same study, 
even in small samples. Additionally, a thorough literature review failed to uncover published 
work reporting the wide range of WAIS-III/WMS-III indices in a university sample. This is a 
serious concern given the WAIS-III and WMS-III are the neuropsychological instruments most 
likely to have influence, not only into the clinic and courtroom, but in the academic setting as 
well. 
Questions and Hypotheses 
The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the following questions: 
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Question 1 
Is overt academic accommodation and/or stimulant medication seeking associated with 
performance on intelligence and memory tests? 
Hypothesis 1. In keeping with findings that performance on neuropsychological tests  
is often feigned in those seeking other forms of external gain, it is expected that those overtly 
seeking recommendations for academic accommodations and/or stimulant medications (External 
Incentive) will show significantly lower performance on those measures when compared to a 
normal control group (Control) and a clinical group comprised of clients not overtly expressing 
interest in receiving such external incentives (No External Incentive). More specially, the author 
expects to find particularly lower performance on measures requiring thinking speed and 
attention (e.g., Digit Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Symbol Search, Digit-Symbol Coding) in 
the External Incentive group as those symptoms have been shown to be among the most sensitive 
to noncredible performance. 
Question 2 
Do those seeking psychoeducational evaluations for overt external incentives differ from 
those not overly seeking external incentives and control participants according to validity indices 
from the WAIS-III/WMS-III? 
Hypothesis 2. Just as litigation status has been a variable to consider in forensic contexts 
because of its association with poor neuropsychological performance, it is hypothesized that 
overtly seeking accommodations and/or stimulant medications will be associated with inflated 
failure rates on tests of noncredible performance. Therefore, it is expected that the External 
Incentive group will perform significantly more poorly from the other two groups (No External 
Incentive and Control) on all validity indices. For those indices where low performance indicates 
a high probability of noncredible performance, it is expected that the External Incentive group 
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will show the lowest mean scores. For those indices where higher scores indicate an increased 
probability of malingering, it is expected that the External Incentive group will show the highest 
mean scores. Moreover, the author expects that a higher proportion of clients in the External 
Incentive group will score in the noncredible range on the validity indices than those in the other 
groups. 
Question 3 
Does the proportion of positive cases and overall proportional degree of severity of 
malingering vary positively along the control – no external incentive – external incentive 
dimension? 
Hypothesis 3. Given that the clinical setting of this study is utilized by a high number of 
those seeking external gain, and that recent research has demonstrated a high failure rate on the 
Word Memory Test in a similar population, the rate of noncredible performance according to the 
Slick Criteria in the entire clinical sample is expected to be similar to rates in other general 
clinical settings where compensation seeking is a factor (20%). That rate should skew highest 
among persons in the External Incentive group as rates have been shown to be higher in groups 
containing an increased number of clients overtly seeking external gain (Ardolf et al., 2007; 
Mittenberg et al., 2002). Moreover, the rate of noncredible performance is expected to 
progressively increase according to group along the incentive seeking dimension (control, no 
external incentive, external incentive).  
Question 4 
Do those reporting a history of previous psychological diagnoses have a higher rate of 
noncredible performance than those who did not report such a history? 
Hypothesis 4. It is hypothesized that those with self-reported, pre-existing cognitive 
disorders will have a lower rate of noncredible performance. It is thought that those individuals  
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are less likely to exaggerate their deficits in order to obtain external gain, since the basis for 
obtaining accommodations has been established by previous health providers – often years prior 
to the current evaluation. On the other hand, those seeking new diagnoses may have a higher 
need to overstate or exaggerate deficits since they have demonstrated satisfactory scholastic 
performance to the degree that qualified them for university study. 
Questions 5 and 6 
What is the association between meeting Slick Criteria for probable MND and the 
outcomes of ultimate diagnosis and treatment recommendations? Is there an association between 
being categorized as putting forth noncredible testing behavior, according to the Slick Criteria, 
and likelihood of obtaining accommodations and/or medication referrals as recommended by the 
psychological clinic? 
Hypothesis 5. Preliminary findings from simulation studies (Harrison et al., 2007; Osmon et al., 
2006) and initial clinical observations of failure of indices from the Word Memory Test have 
been associated with decreased performance on some cognitive measures in LD and ADHD 
malingering. Moreover, effort has been associated with a considerable amount of variance in 
cognitive testing performance (Green et al., 2001). Accordingly, it is expected that a 
disproportionate percentage of those meeting Slick Criteria in the current study will be diagnosed 
with current brain based disorders (e.g., Cognitive Disorder NOS, ADHD, LD) as an outcome of 
their current psychoeducational evaluation. 
 Hypothesis 6. Because it is thought that those meeting the Slick Criteria for probable  
MND exaggerate neurocognitive deficits on objective measures, they are also more likely to 
receive recommendations to address those apparent deficiencies if their simulation goes 
undetected. Moreover, since most clinic evaluations did not utilize validity indices and that 
researchers claim behavioral observations alone are poor indicators of noncredible performance 
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(Faust, Guilmette et al., 1988; Faust, Hart, & Guilmette, 1988; Frederick, Sarfaty, Johnston, & 
Powel, 1994; Heaton et al., 1978), those retrospectively meeting Slick Criteria as per the current 
study, were likely not identified as putting forth malingered performance at the time of their 
evaluation. Therefore, those clients meeting Slick Criteria were probably most likely to be 
recommended to receive academic accommodations and/or recommended for a medication 
consultation at a higher rate than those not meeting criteria for probable MND because they 
demonstrated impairment on cognitive testing sufficient to justify obtaining a diagnosis and 
accompanying recommendations. 
Question 7 
What are the specificity values for each derived WAIS-III/WMS-III validity index when 
compared with a nonclinical control sample and a clinical sample expressing no overt external 
incentive? 
Hypothesis 7. Specificity levels of many of the WAIS-III/WMS-III embedded indices 
have shown to be lower when groups meeting Slick Criteria are compared with non-MND 
clinical groups as opposed to comparison with normal control participants. The specificity levels 
of each validity index in this study are expected to be greater when those meeting the Slick 
Criteria are compared to the nonclinical control group rather than when compared to those not 
overtly seeking external incentives those seeking external incentives but not meeting Slick 
Criteria for probable MND. 
Question 8  
How effective is each test according to varying theoretical base rates when considering 
sensitivity, specificity, and hypothetical base rates of noncredible performance? As this is an 
entirely exploratory matter, no specific hypotheses are forwarded for this research question. 
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Methods 
Participants and Data 
The author utilized archival data from two sources for this project. The first dataset 
consisted of normative data from a portion of a large-scale joint experimental and clinical 
working memory project conducted between May 2005 and December 2006 at a public 
university in the southern United States. As part of that construct validation research protocol, 
participants were administered tests of intellectual functioning, memory functioning, and 
experimental measures of cognitive functioning. For the purposes of this study, the author 
utilized only intellectual and memory functioning data forming a large control sample. Of the 
224 participants that originally agreed to participate in that study to obtain extra credit in 
undergraduate psychology courses, complete data from 182 participants were obtained. 
Exclusion criteria included visual and/or hearing impairment (n = 14), a psychiatric diagnosis 
resulting in cognitive impairment (n = 0), English as a second language (n = 5), or if the 
participant did not complete the study protocol (n = 23). No participant was excluded according 
to gender, race, ethnicity, or academic status. All participants were provided informed consent as 
part of the research protocol. Mean age in the control sample was 20.56 (SD = 3.67) with 47 
(25.8%) males and 135 females (74.2%). Most participants were Caucasian (149, 81.9%). 
Another 15 (8.2%) were African American, 6 were Hispanic (3.3%), and 12 (6.6%) were 
identified as other.  
The second data source consisted of information obtained from clients seeking services at 
the university’s Psychological Services Center from 1999 to 2008. Exclusion criteria included 
visual and/or hearing impairment, current psychiatric or neurological disorders warranting legal 
disability status, history of moderate-severe traumatic brain injury, stroke, dementia, 
chronic/severe neurological condition(s), or English as a second language. While the final 
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clinical sample was 986, the clients were administered a fixed/flexible battery and therefore the 
individual test-by-test analyses presented here may not employ the entire sample but be limited 
to those who completed the particular measure of interest. Participants in this study were 
typically individuals self-referred to the clinic and evaluated for possible psychoeducational 
problems using a broad battery surveying domains of intelligence, memory, attention, academic 
achievement, and psychological/emotional functioning. All clinical participants consented to 
have their assessment information used confidentially in future research. This project was 
reviewed and approved by the Louisiana State University Institutional Review Board. 
Individuals presented for assessment with a variety of primary complaints generally 
including depression or anxiety symptoms, learning problems, memory problems, and/or 
attentional concerns in the context of a university setting. As part of a comprehensive 
psychoeducational assessment, individuals were administered tests of intellectual functioning, 
memory functioning, attention/concentration, academic achievement, and psychological 
functioning. For the purposes of this study, only the testing data regarding intellectual and 
memory functioning were analyzed. Mean age in the clinical sample was 22.62 (SD = 6.80) with 
513 (52.0%) males and 473 females (47.9%). Participant ethnic groups included Caucasian (n = 
836, 84.7%), African American of (n = 112, 11.3%), Asian (n = 6, .6%), Hispanic (n = 18, 
1.8%), Middle-Eastern (n = 6, .6%), and other (8, .8%). Demographic characteristics of the 
clinical sample regarding primary DSM-IV-TR diagnostic category are presented in Table 2. 
Additionally, 28.1% of those diagnosed with primary Axis I disorder also met criteria for 
another, co-occuring Axis I disorder (Table 3). Presentation of diagnostic rates in each clinical 
group (No External Incentive, External Incentive) is in Tables 4 and 5. 
Procedures 
 
For the experimental study, all measures were either administered by a senior level clinical  
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Table 2 
Frequency and Percentage of Cases by Primary Diagnostic Category in the Clinical Group 
 
 n   %  
     
Depressive Disorders 75  7.6  
     
Anxiety Disorders 114  11.6  
     
Adjustment Disorders 12  1.2  
     
Bipolar Disorders 15  1.5  
     
Other Mood Disorders 4  .4  
     
ADHD 236  23.9  
     
Learning Disorders 173  17.5  
     
Academic Problems (v-code) 12  1.2  
     
Cognitive Disorders 84  8.5  
     
Eating Disorders 2  0.2  
     
Substance Use Disorders 9  0.9  
     
Misc. V-Codes 5  0.5  
     
Information Unavailable 5  0.5  
     
Other  16  1.6  
     
Diagnosis Deferred 15  1.5  
     
No Diagnosis 209  21.2  
     
Total 986  100  
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Table 3 
Frequency and Percentage of Cases by Co-Occurring Secondary Diagnostic Category in the 
Clinical Group 
 
 
 n   %  
     
Depressive Disorders 48  4.7  
     
Anxiety Disorders 87  8.8  
     
Adjustment Disorders 10  1.0  
     
Other Mood Disorders 4  0.4  
     
ADHD 28  2.8  
     
Learning Disorders 67  6.8  
     
Academic Problems (v-code) 7  0.7  
     
Cognitive Disorders 7  0.7  
     
Eating Disorders 1  0.1  
     
Substance Use Disorders 17  1.7  
     
Misc. V-Codes 5  0.5  
     
Other 2  0.2  
     
Total 283  28.4  
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Table 4 
Frequency and Percentage of Cases by Primary Diagnostic Category in the External Incentive 
Group 
 
 
 n   %  
     
Depressive Disorders 21  4.1  
     
Anxiety Disorders 43  8.5  
     
Adjustment Disorders 5  1  
     
Bipolar Disorders 6  1.2  
     
Other Mood Disorders 2  .4  
     
ADHD 151  29.7  
     
Learning Disorders 115  22.6  
     
Academic Problems (v-code) 6  1.2  
     
Cognitive Disorders 50  9.8  
     
Eating Disorders 1  .2  
     
Substance Use Disorders 2  .4  
     
Misc. V-Codes 2  .2  
     
Information Unavailable 2  .2  
     
Other  9  1.8  
     
Diagnosis Deferred 6  1.2  
     
No Diagnosis 87  17.1  
     
Total 508  100  
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Table 5 
Frequency and Percentage of Cases by Primary Diagnostic Category in the No External 
Incentive Group 
 
 
 n   %  
     
Depressive Disorders 54  11.3  
     
Anxiety Disorders 71  14.9  
     
Adjustment Disorders 7  1.5  
     
Bipolar Disorders 9  1.9  
     
Other Mood Disorders 2  .4  
     
ADHD 85  17.8  
     
Learning Disorders 58  12.1  
     
Academic Problems (v-code) 6  1.3  
     
Cognitive Disorders 34  7.1  
     
Eating Disorders 1  .2  
     
Substance Use Disorders 7  1.5  
     
Misc. V-Codes 3  .6  
     
Information Unavailable 3  .6  
     
Other  7  1.5  
     
Diagnosis Deferred 9  1.9  
     
No Diagnosis 122  25.5  
     
Total 478  100  
     
 
 
 
66 
psychology graduate student specializing in neuropsychology or by an advanced undergraduate 
research assistant trained to administer the measures according to standardized instructions in the 
respective manuals. The research assistant was supervised on an ongoing basis to ensure 
maintained consistency and fidelity of test administration. The measures were given in one 
session, which took approximately two and a half hours to complete. While the administration 
order was counterbalanced during the experimental project, no such experimental control was 
possible for the clinical group. However, administration order effects for the WAIS-III and 
WMS-III are insignificant (Zhu & Tulsky, 2000), so strict counterbalancing was not a concern 
clinically. 
For the clinical data, clinical psychology graduate students trained in test administration, 
theory, and application administered and scored all tests according to standardization procedures. 
As part of a full psychoeducational evaluation, clients were also administered a clinical 
interview. During this process, clients provided informed consent for psychological services, 
underwent full evaluation, and were provided with feedback regarding cognitive and emotional 
status that included diagnostic impressions. 
Data Integrity  
To ensure data integrity, completed protocols from the experimental project were 
carefully checked for errors and corrected along each of the three stages of data checking. That 
procedure consisted of 1) initially having trained undergraduate research assistants rescore and 
recalculate all subtest raw scores, 2) then converting all raw scores to standardized scores based 
on the national normative sample, and 3) finally entering those data into a computer spreadsheet. 
Through that process, it was discovered that there was at least one error in approximately 8.5% 
of the participants’ data files, which were subsequently corrected. Correlations between the 
original dataset and the corrected dataset were all greater than .90 for every single variable in the 
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dataset, with an overall multiple correlation between original and corrected datasets exceeding 
.98. Data from the clinical and experimental samples were then checked for extreme values, 
outliers (four standard deviations away from the mean), data misentries, and any values not 
associated with particular tests. On the basis of that analysis, no participant was excluded. 
Grouping Variables 
In order to establish group status in the clinical sample, client charts were reviewed for 
their referral sources and reasons for referral. From that information, group determination was 
made according to each client’s expressed reason for obtaining a psychoeducational evaluation. 
Accordingly, when the clinical demographic 
information included clients’ expressed interest in obtaining recommendations for academic 
accommodations and/or stimulant medication, they were categorized into the External Incentive 
group (n = 508). Of those in the External Incentive group, 428 (84.3%) were seeking academic 
accommodations, 50 (9.8%) were seeking medications, 30 (5.9%) were seeking medications and 
accommodations. If no such information was available to indicate such incentive seeking, the 
clients were designated into the No External Incentive group (n = 478). According to reliability 
coding analysis, 91% agreement of group status was obtained by independent raters. In the 
discrepant cases, the lead researcher (R.P.) independently reviewed the cases and determined 
group status to resolve conflicting values. Therefore, three groups were derived for this project: 
1) Control, 2) No External Incentive, and 3) External Incentive. 
Measures 
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991)  
The PAI is a self-report objective measure of personality traits and clinical symptoms 
consisting of 344 statements on which participants can answer as False, Slightly True, Mainly 
True, or Very True. Each response form is computer scored and responses are compared with the 
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normative sample. Upon scoring, the PAI provides t-scores for four validity and nine clinical 
scales, with t-scores > 70 indicating clinically notable elevations. The Negative Impression 
Management (NIM) validity scale is one of the most useful measures of symptom exaggeration 
(Boccaccini, Murrie, & Duncan, 2006; Calhoun, Earnst, Tucker, Kirby, & Beckham, 2000; 
Rogers, Sewell, Cruise, Wang, & Ustad, 1998). Rogers et al. (1998) suggested that a t-score of  
> 77 correctly classifies 74% of honest responders and 84% of malingerers. Calhoun et al. (2000) 
reported using t-score cut ranging from 73 to 81. Boccaccini et al. (2006) indicated that using a 
cutoff of 81 in a forensic facility correctly identified 91% of malingerers who were diagnosed 
according to the Structured Inventory of Reported Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 
1992). However, 70% of those misidentified as malingerers according to the NIM score 
performed in the “indeterminate” range of malingering on the SIRS, which is just below the 
cutoff for definite malingering and strongly suggests a negative response bias. Rogers, Sewell, 
Morey, and Ustad (1996) have also devised a discriminant function that has shown utility in 
differentiating malingered performance (Baity, Siefert, Chambers, & Blais, 2007; Sumanti, 
Boone, Savodnik, & Gorsuch, 2006). Moreover, the Malingering Index (Gaies, 1994) of the PAI 
has shown to be robust index of feigning in several samples  (Blanchard, McGrath, Pogge, & 
Khadivi, 2003; Wang et al.). 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997a) 
Intellectual functioning was measured by the WAIS-III. In most cases, all subtests except 
the optional Object Assembly subtest were administered according to standardized protocol. 
Participants’ raw scores were compared according to age with the national standardization 
sample and converted to scaled and standard scores according to standard manualized procedures 
as per the administration manuals (Wechsler, 1997a, 1997b) 
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Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997b) 
Memory functioning was measured by the Wechsler Memory Scale-III. For the WMS-III, 
no optional subtests were administered. Since the WAIS-III and WMS-III contain identical 
Letter-Number Sequencing and Digit Span subtests, each subtest was administered only once on 
either measure. 
Malingering Index Scores from the WAIS-III/WMS-III and PAI 
Each index score for the measures was calculated according to methodology as described 
by the researcher noted below. In accordance with current recommendations (Bianchini et al., 
2001; Greve & Bianchini, 2004), the author employed only those measures validated by at least 
one study using a known groups design. The following measures have also been shown to be 
useful in differentiating simulated noncredible performance as well (see above review). The 
following scores will be derived from the indices in Table 6 order to apply Slick et al.’s (1999) 
criteria to individual cases. Table 6 also contains cutoff scores used to categorize clinical patients 
according to the Slick Criteria for probable response bias. As recommended elsewhere (Babikian 
et al., 2006), evidence from two or more measures fulfilling Criterion B level evidence should 
suggest noncredible performance according to Slick Criteria. Therefore, performance on any two 
or more of the indices from the WAIS-III/WMS-III associated with noncredible performance are 
sufficient to meet Criterion B level evidence to support a finding of a probable noncredible case. 
Another method to classify as probable involves obtaining evidence from at least one of the 
WAIS-III/WMS-III indices and self-report evidence of a response bias from the PAI. As a result, 
several possible combinations are available to establish probable noncredible performance. To 
guard against false positive findings of noncredible performance, the author chose cutoff scores 
with high specificity (90% to 100%). In keeping with the conservative approach, any indices that 
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share subtest values in their calculation (e.g., Mittenberg Index and Reliable Digits) were only 
used to fulfill only one of the two B2 level findings per case. 
Table 6 
Cutoff Scores Corresponding to Index 
Index Cutoff Score  
   
Reliable Digit Span (Greiffenstein et al., 1994) < 6  
   
Mittenberg Index (Mittenberg et al., 1995) > .21  
   
Vocabulary minus Digit Span (Mittenberg et al., 1995) > 4  
   
Maximum Digits Forward (Babikian et al., 2006; Heinly et al., 2005) < 4  
   
Age-Corrected Scale Score (Iverson, 1991; Iverson & Franzen, 1994) < 4  
   
Processing Speed Index (Etherton, Bianchini, Heinly et al., 2006) < 70  
   
Rarely Missed Index (Killgore & DellaPietra, 2000b) < 40  
   
WAIS-III Working Memory (Etherton, Bianchini, Ciota et al., 2006) < 70  
   
Faces I (Glassmire et al., 2003) < 23  
   
Auditory Delayed Recognition (Langeluddecke & Lucas, 2003) < 42  
   
Ord et al. Index (Ord et al., 2007) > 3  
   
Negative Impression Management t-score (Morey, 1991) > 81t  
   
Roger’s Discriminant Function t-score (Rogers et al., 1996) > 60t  
   
Malingering Index (Morey, 1991) > 3  
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Results 
Hypothesis 1 
Those in the External Incentive group will show significantly lower performance on 
the WAIS-III and WMS-III when compared to the No External Incentive and Control 
groups, particularly on measures of thinking speed and attention. WAIS-III FSIQ scores by 
group were in the average range: Control (M = 110.13, SD = 11.32), No External Incentive (M = 
105.62, SD = 12.60), and External Incentive (M = 101.63, SD = 12.47). To test the first 
hypothesis, two separate one-way MANOVA’s were conducted to determine if control and 
clinical groups differed on subtests from the measures of intelligence and memory. The first 
MANOVA included Group (Control, External Incentive, and No External Incentive) X WAIS-III 
subtests (Picture Completion, Vocabulary, Digit-Symbol Coding, Similarities, Block Design, 
Arithmetic, Picture Arrangement, Matrix Reasoning, Information, Digit Span, Letter-Number 
Sequencing, Comprehension, and Symbol Search). All power analyses were performed with 
G*Power 3.0.3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The number of participants needed for 
power, (1 – β) = .95, and significance level α = .05 resulted in total sample size of 180 needed to 
detect a small effect (0.10). Upon a significant omnibus F test, follow-up univariate F-tests were 
conducted to determine which subtests differ between groups. A separate power analysis was 
conducted to ensure that the sample size would be adequate to detect a small/medium difference 
between the groups. Based on that analysis, a sample size of 690 would suffice. 
The MANOVA revealed a significant between group main effect F (13, 1114) = 11.03, 
 p < .0001, η2 = .116. Results from that analysis with appropriate univariate and Bonferroni post-
hoc follow-up procedures are presented in Table 7. As can be seen from the post-hoc 
comparisons, all predicted group differences fell in the expected direction with the External 
Incentive group scoring lower than the other two groups across all subtests.  
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Table 7 
Univariate Analysis of Variance for WAIS-III Variables by Group (Clinical v. Control) 
 
Control 
(n = 182) 
 
No External 
Incentive 
(n =  442) 
 
External 
Incentive 
(n =  490) 
 
F 
 
p  
Partial eta-
squared 
 
Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)       
            
Vocabularyabc 13.01 (2.37)  11.77 (2.67)  11.10 (2.85)  33.51  .001  .057 
            
Similaritiesb 11.61 (2.71)  11.03 (2.81)  10.64 (2.88)  8.09  .001  .014 
            
Arithmeticbc 10.74 (2.36)  10.56 (2.60)  9.65 (2.93)  17.42  .001  .030 
            
Digit Spanabc 11.41 (2.73)  10.08 (2.78)  9.34 (2.70)  38.49  .001  .065 
            
Informationbc 11.70 (2.41)  11.39 (2.65)  10.60 (2.75)  15.83  .001  .028 
            
Comprehension 11.91 (2.47)  11.66 (2.68)  11.37 (2.87)  3.01  .050  .005 
            
Letter-Number Seq.abc 11.45 (2.72)  10.59 (2.62)  9.86 (2.64)  25.68  .001  .044 
            
Picture Completionbc 10.73 (3.09)  10.54 (2.95)  10.06 (3.00)  4.72  .009  .008 
            
Digit Symbol Cdabc 11.54 (2.53)  9.36 (2.51)  8.78 (2.65)  76.82  .001  .121 
            
Block Designbc 11.20 (2.81)  10.79 (2.84)  10.24 (3.01)  8.64  .001  .015 
            
Matrix Reasoningbc 12.21 (2.07)  11.91 (2.58)  11.34 (2.71)  9.91  .001  .018 
            
Picture Arrangement 10.37 (2.75)  10.21 (2.64)  10.01 (2.82)  1.34  .263  .002 
            
Symbol Searchabc 12.04 (2.43)  10.06 (2.71)  9.39 (2.73)  64.88  .001  .105 
            
a Control v. No External Incentive, bControl v. External Incentive, cExternal Incentive v. No  
  External Incentive 
Note. All Flagged Post-Hoc Comparisons, p < .05 
 
However, based on those analyses, there were no significant group differences on the 
Comprehension or Picture Arrangement subtests. In keeping with the initial hypothesis, it was 
the measures of processing speed and attentional control that demonstrated the largest group 
differences (i.e., Digit Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Digit-Symbol Coding, Symbol Search). 
Nonparametric analyses via the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test also supported hypothesis one as 
lower scores were strongly associated with the External Incentive group as opposed to the No 
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External Incentive group, W+ (13) = 91, p < .001, and Control group, W+ (13) = 91, p < .001. 
Therefore, those clients explicitly seeking external gain demonstrated lower performance than 
controls and clients not reporting potential for external gain, particularly on the measures of 
processing speed and attentional control. 
 Similar analyses were conducted for the WMS-III subtests. Mean scores for the WMS-III 
General Memory Index by group were as follows: Control (M = 107.62, SD = 10.69), No 
External Incentive (M = 100.97, SD = 13.98), and External Incentive (M = 98.51, SD = 13.96). 
The second MANOVA included Group (Control, External Incentive, and No External Incentive) 
X WMS-III core subtests (Logical Memory I, Faces I, Verbal Paired Associates I, Family 
Pictures I, Spatial Span, Logical Memory II, Faces II, Verbal Paired Associates II, Family 
Pictures II). A power analysis was performed to determine the number of participants needed for 
power, (1 – β) = .95, and significance level, α = .05 resulting in total sample size of 150 to detect 
a small effect (0.10). Upon a significant omnibus F, follow-up univariate F-tests were conducted 
to determine which subtests differ between groups. A separate power analysis was conducted to 
ensure that the sample size would be adequate to detect a small/medium difference (0.15) 
between the groups. Based on that analysis, a sample size of 690 was needed. The MANOVA 
revealed a significant between group main effect of group F (8, 1151) = 4.44, p < .0001, η2 = 
.03. 
Results from appropriate univariate and post-hoc follow-up procedures are presented in 
Table 8. While mean group performance on all of the measures were in the expected direction 
with the External Incentive group scoring lower than the other two groups, the External Incentive 
group only performed significantly lower than the No External Incentive and Control groups on 
the Logical Memory subtests, thus partially supporting the hypothesis. Nonparametric analyses 
via the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test also supported the hypothesis as lower scores on the  
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Table 8 
Univariate Analysis of Variance for WMS-III Variables by Group (Clinical v. Control) 
 
Control 
(n = 182) 
 
No External 
Incentive 
(n =  466) 
 
External 
Incentive 
(n =  503) 
 F 
 
p  
Partial 
eta-
squared 
 
Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)       
            
Logical Memory Iabc 11.13 (2.53)  10.09 (2.84)  9.55 (2.81)  21.81  .001  .037 
            
Faces Ib 10.38 (2.92)  9.93 (2.93)  9.60 (2.98)  4.88  .008  .008 
            
Verbal Paired Ass. Ib 10.67 (2.51)  10.32 (2.93)  9.98 (2.97)  4.18f  .016  .007 
            
Family Pictures Iab 10.90 (2.40)  10.05 (3.11)  9.82 (3.18)  8.43  .001  .014 
            
Logical Memory IIabc 11.76 (2.66)  10.41 (2.95)  9.84 (2.84)  30.19  .001  .050 
            
Faces IIab 10.41 (2.58)  9.83 (2.67)  9.79 (2.79)  3.73  .024  .006 
            
Verbal Paired Ass. IIab 11.19 (1.75)  10.59 (2.55)  10.42 (2.69)  6.33f  .002  .011 
            
Family Pictures IIab 10.81 (2.43)  9.85 (3.23)  9.64 (3.26)  9.54  .001  .016 
            
a Control v. No External Incentive, bControl v. External Incentive, cExternal Incentive v. No  
  External Incentive 
Note. All Flagged Post-Hoc Comparisons, p < .05 
 
WMS-III were strongly associated with the External Incentive group as opposed to the No 
External Incentive group, W+ (8) = 36, p = .008, and Control group, W+ (8) = 36, p < .008. In 
sum, there was strong support for the predicted group differences on intellectual functioning 
measures, but less parametric support for the same contrasts concerning the memory measures. 
Nevertheless, all scores fell in the predicted ordinal direction, a finding supported 
nonparametrically for both sets of measures. 
Hypothesis 2 
The External Incentive group will perform significantly different from the other two 
groups (No External Incentive and Control) on all validity indices, indicating a higher level 
of noncredible performance. To test the second hypothesis, an omnibus MANOVA was 
75 
conducted and followed by a series of one-way between subjects ANOVA’s subsequent to a 
significant MANOVA finding. Group served as the independent variable and each of the 
examined WAIS-III/WMS-III validity indices were dependent variables. Given the results from 
the power analyses conducted above, the sample size obtained was adequate to detect a small to 
medium difference. The MANOVA revealed a significant between group main effect, F (11, 
1100) = 12.34, p < .0001, η2 = .109. Appropriate univariate and post-hoc follow-up procedures 
are presented in Table 9. Since the Ord et al. and Rarely Missed Indices from the WMS-III 
violated conservative conventions for acceptable skewness and/or kurtosis (< -1 or > 1), only 
nonparametric comparisons were conducted with those latter two variables. 
Table 9 
Univariate Analysis of Variance for WAIS-III/WMS-III Validity Indices by Group (Clinical v. 
Control) 
 
 
Control 
(n = 182) 
 
No External 
Incentive 
(n = 435) 
 
External 
Incentive 
(n = 487) 
 F 
 
p  
Partial eta-
squared 
 
Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)       
            
WAIS-III WMIabc 106.79 (12.73)  102.25 (13.43)  97.38 (13.55)  36.48  .001  .062 
            
Processing Speed 
Indexabc 
109.81 (12.30)  98.40 (12.82)  94.82 (12.99)  91.02  .001  .142 
            
Auditory Recognition-
Delayed Rawabc 
50.81 (2.31)  49.80 (2.75)  49.30 (2.99)  19.67  .001  .035 
            
WMS-III Faces I Rawb 39.23 (4.22)  38.23 (4.60)  37.57 (4.86)  8.63  .001  .015 
            
Max. Digits Fwd.abc 7.20 (1.08)  6.72 (1.28)  6.50 (1.24)  21.16  .001  .037 
            
Mittenberg Index -.41 (.96)  -.40 (1.05)  -.25 (1.01)  3.03  .049  .005 
            
Reliable Digitsabc 10.95 (2.04)  10.04 (2.14)  9.40 (2.12)  37.39  .001  .064 
            
Vocabulary-Digit Span 1.60 (2.76)  1.72 (3.33)  1.78 (3.36)  .20  .816  .001 
            
a Control v. No External Incentive, bControl v. External Incentive, cExternal Incentive v. No  
  External Incentive 
Note. All Flagged Post-Hoc Comparisons p < .05 
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Omnibus one-way Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA revealed that group significantly affected the 
level of performance on the Ord et al. Index, χ2 (2, 1152) = 33.27, p < .0001 (Table 10). In order 
to specify which groups differed according to the dependent variable, follow-up pairwise 
comparisons were conducted with Mann-Whitney U, controlling α for multiple comparisons, 
establishing significance at p < .017. In the first follow-up comparisons, control participants 
performed at a lower rate than those in No External Incentive clinical group, U (1, 648) = 
36,415.00, p < .0001, and those in the External Incentive seeking clinical group, U (1, 685) = 
.37,069.00, p < .0001. However, the No External Incentive group and External Incentive seeking 
clinical groups did not differ, U (1, 969) = 111,992.50, p = .07. Medians, means, and standard 
deviations for the Ord et al. index are presented in Table 10. An omnibus one-way Kruskal-
Wallis ANOVA revealed that group status was not significantly associated with the scores on the 
Rarely Missed Index, χ2 (2, 1146) = .58, p = .75. Due to an insignificant initial omnibus finding, 
pairwise group comparisons were not conducted in order to protect against type I error. Medians, 
means, and standard deviations for the Rarely Missed Index by group are presented in Table 11.  
Table 10 
Median, Means, and Standard Deviations for the Ord et al. Index by Group (Clinical v. Control) 
 
 
Median  Mean (SD)  
     
Control  (n = 182) .00  .05 (.28)  
     
No External Incentive (n = 466) .00  .30 (.75)  
     
External Incentive (n = 503) .00  .39 (.85)  
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Table 11 
Median, Means, and Standard Deviations for the Rarely Missed Index by Group (Clinical v. 
Control) 
 
 
Median  Mean (SD)  
     
Control  (n = 182) 204.00  198.46 (24.62)  
     
No External Incentive (n = 464) 204.00  195.99 (29.44)  
     
External Incentive (n = 500) 204.00  194.44 (31.11)  
     
 
There was general support for hypothesis three as the control participants scored 
significantly different than the No External Incentive and the External Incentive groups in the  
expected direction on five of ten validity indices. Further support for the hypothesis was also 
obtained via a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank analysis. Scores on the indices were associated with 
noncredible performance in the External Incentive group compared with the No External 
Incentive group, W+ (10) = 55, p = .002, and Control group, W+ (10) = 55,  p < .002. Thus, there 
was a greater degree of noncredible performance associated with the External Incentive group 
rather than the other two groups. Additionally, the aggregated rank differences also strongly 
supported the dimensionality assertion in the following hypothesis, for which parametric 
statistics also provided moderate support. 
Because indices from the PAI (Roger’s Discriminant Function, Malingering Index, & 
Negative Impression Management) were only administered to the clinical participants, a separate 
MANOVA was conducted comparing only the External Incentive and no External Incentive 
groups. The MANOVA revealed a significant between group main effect, F (3, 657) = 7.35, p < 
.0001, η2 = .03. While the External Incentive and No External Incentive group did not differ on 
the Malingering Index from the PAI, the External Incentive group scored significantly higher on 
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Roger’s Discriminant function. Unexpectedly, the No External Incentive demonstrated 
significantly higher mean scores on the Negative Impression Management scale, counter to the 
author’s hypothesis (Table 12). With the exception of the Negative Impression Management 
scale, all mean index scores again fell in the expected direction with the External Incentive group 
performing as predicted, supporting the overall hypothesis. 
Table 12 
Univariate Analysis of Variance for PAI Validity Indices by Clinical Group (No External 
Incentive v. External Incentive) 
 
 
No External 
Incentive 
(n =  305) 
 
External 
Incentive 
(n =  356) 
 
 
Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  
     
Roger’s Function** 50.15 (10.15)  53.20 (10.37)  
     
Malingering Index .79 (.87)  .78 (.89)  
     
Neg. Impression Mgt.* 55.15 (12.12)  53.32 (11.03)  
     
*p < .05., **p < .001 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 & Classification of Noncredible Performance 
The rate of noncredible performance as per Slick Criteria in the entire clinical sample is 
expected to be similar to rates in other general clinical settings where compensation seeking 
is a factor (20%) and the rate should be significantly higher among persons in the External 
Incentive group. While it was fairly common for control participants to score in the noncredible 
range on the Mittenberg Index and Vocabulary Minus Digit Span, failure on others was rare. 
Although means from the validity indices for the External Incentive clients reflected greater 
levels of noncredible performance than the control participants and No External Incentive group 
(see hypothesis two analyses), the proportion of clients falling in the noncredible range according 
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to published cutoff scores on each individual index differed only on three indices (Auditory 
Recognition-Delayed Raw, Mittenberg Index, & Reliable Digits) for the External Incentive 
group when compared with the No External Incentive group (Tables 13 & 14). This likely 
suggests that, while the External Incentive group performed to a greater degree in the direction of 
the noncredible range on each index, the difference may not be as clinically meaningful for some 
indices. Despite those observations from parametric findings, results from a Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test revealed that a higher proportion of those in the External Incentive group, compared to 
the No External Incentive group, scored in the noncredible range when examining test failure 
rate as a whole, W+ (14) = 95, p < .005. Thus the results reflected the predicted ordinality of the 
scores by group. 
In order to further assess group differences according to failure rates on validity indices, 
the author also examined the proportion of clients failing at least one measure. 46.3% of the 
External Incentive group failed at least one index from the WAIS-III/WMS-III, indicating 
possible noncredible performance according to the Slick Criteria (i.e., only one level of Criterion 
B evidence), demonstrating that it was fairly common to fail one or more index. In contrast, 
36.8% of the No External Incentive group failed one or more, which is less than the External 
Incentive group (46.3%), χ2 (1) = 9.0, p = .003. Table 15 contains the cumulative percentage of 
WAIS-III/WMS-III validity indices failed per group. Next, the author presents data regarding 
multiple failures. Despite the high failure rates on the Mittenberg Index and Vocabulary Minus 
Digit Span, along with some failures on other indices in the control group, none of the control 
participants’ combination of index scores met Criterion B of the Slick Criteria, resulting in 100% 
specificity for the current classification scheme (i.e., no false positives). The rate of noncredible 
performance according to Slick Criteria, when accounting for all indices (including the PAI), 
was lower than expected (n = 59, 12.1% of the External Incentive group, 5.98% of the entire  
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Table 13 
Participants Scoring beyond Cutoff Scores for Validity Indices by Group* 
 
Control 
 No External 
Incentive 
 External 
Incentive 
 
 
n (%)  n (%)  n (%)  
       
WAIS-III WMI 0 (0)  2 (0.4)  6 (1.2)  
       
Processing Speed Index 0 (0)  4 (0.9)  6 (1.2)  
       
Digit Span Scale Score 0 (0)  4 (0.9)  9 (1.8)  
       
Auditory Recognition-
Delayed Rawb 
0 (0)  3 (0.6)  15 (3.0)  
       
WMS-III Faces I Raw 0 (0)  1 (0.2)  5 (1.0)  
       
Max. Digits Fwd. 3 (1.6)  10 (2.2)  16 (3.2)  
       
Mittenberg Indexb 42 (23.1)  125 (28)  170 (34.1)  
       
Reliable Digitsb 2 (1.1)  12 (2.6)  32 (6.4)  
       
Vocabulary-Digit Span 40 (22)  131 (27.3)  148 (29.5)  
       
Ord et al. Index 0 (0)  12 (2.6)  20 (4.0)  
       
Rarely Missed Index 0 (0)  2 (0.4)  1 (0.2)  
       
Roger’s Functiona ---  59 (19.3)  81 (22.8)  
       
Malingering Indexa ---  12 (3.9)  16 (4.5)  
       
Neg. Impression Mgta ---  20 (6.6)  16 (4.5)  
       
*Reflects percentage of participants in analyses. 
aIndex not administered to control participants. 
bAll Flagged Chi-Square Comparisons: No External Incentive vs. External Incentive, p < .05. 
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Table 14 
Participants Scoring beyond Cutoff Scores for Validity Indices for Control and Total Clinical 
Group* 
 
 
Control  Clinical  
 
n (%)  n (%)  
     
WAIS-III WMI 0 (0)  8 (0.8)  
     
Processing Speed Index 0 (0)  10 (1.0)  
     
Digit Span Scale Score 0 (0)  13 (1.4)  
     
Auditory Recognition-
Delayed Raw 
0 (0)  18 (1.9)  
     
WMS-III Faces I Raw 0 (0)  6 (0.6)  
     
Max. Digits Fwd. 3 (1.6)  26 (2.7)  
     
Mittenberg Index 42 (23.1)  295 (31.2)  
     
Reliable Digits 2 (1.1)  44 (4.6)  
     
Vocabulary-Digit Span 40 (22)  279 (29.1)  
     
Ord et al. Index 0 (0)  32 (3.3)  
     
Rarely Missed Index 0 (0)  3 (0.3)  
     
Roger’s Functiona ---  140 (21.2)  
     
Malingering Indexa ---  28 (4.2)  
     
Neg. Impression Mgta ---  36 (5.4)  
     
*Reflects percentage of participants in analyses.. 
aIndex not administered to control participants. 
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Table 15 
Number of WAIS-III/WMS-III Indices Failed according to Percentage of Participants beyond 
Cutoff Scores 
 
 
Control  
No External 
Incentive 
 
External 
Incentive 
 
Total 
Clinical 
 
Number of 
Indices Failed 
n (%)  n (%)  n (%)  n (%)  
         
0 123 (67.6)  302 (63.2)  273 (53.7)  575 (58.3)  
         
1 35 (19.2)  75 (15.7)  102 (20.1)  177 (18.0)  
         
2 21 (11.5)  79 (16.5)  96 (18.9)  175 (17.7)  
         
3 2 (1.1)  13 (2.7)  17 (3.3)  30 (3.0)  
         
4 1 (0.5)  7 (1.5)  15 (3.0)  22 (2.2)  
         
5 ---  2 (0.4)  2 (0.4)  4 (0.4)  
         
6   ---  2 (0.4)  2 (0.2)  
         
7     1 (0.2)  1 (0.1)  
         
8     ---  ---  
         
 
clinical sample). Please recall that those in the No External Incentive group did not satisfy 
Criterion A (presence of a substantial external incentive) of the Slick Criteria, thus precluding 
them from meeting full Slick Criteria for MND. However, members of the No External Incentive 
group (n = 42, 9.7%) did have index combinations that satisfied Slick Criterion B (see 
classification scheme in the Methods section), which was not significantly different from the 
External Incentive group (12.1%), χ2 (1) = 2.1, p = .14. However, this lack of finding is likely 
due to the imperfect classification methodology of group assignment. When using the WAIS-
III/WMS-III indices alone, the rate of positive Criterion B findings in the External Incentive 
group dropped to just 17 (3.5%) and 9 (0.9%) in the No External Incentive group, χ2 (1) = 2.1, 
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 p = .15. Therefore, just 3% (n = 26) of the entire clinical group met Criterion B evidence when 
only using the WAIS-III/WMS-III. As a result, excluding the PAI indices in the present analyses 
would have resulted in not identifying at least a 72.2% of those meeting Slick Criteria in this 
sample. Regardless of incentive level, 10.2% of the entire clinical sample met Criterion B of the 
Slick Criteria when combining failure rates across the WAIS-III/WMS-III and PAI indices (see 
Table 16 for description of Criterion B rate according to group), which was lower than expected. 
Table 16 
 
Frequency of Participants by Group Satisfying Criterion B from the Slick Criteria according to 
Index Type 
 
 
WAIS-III/WMS-III 
Indices Only 
 
All 
Indices 
 
 
n (%)  n (%)  
     
Control* 0 (0%)  N/A  
     
No External Incentive 9 (0.9%)  42 (9.7)  
     
External Incentive 17 (3.5)  59 (12.1)  
     
*Control Participants not Administered PAI 
 
Concordance of clinical behavioral observations and Slick Criteria follow. Of the 59 
clients in the probable MND group, behavioral observations made by the evaluating clinician 
during the assessment indicated “fidgety” behavior (n = 1), giving up easily (n = 1), variable 
effort (n = 3), anxiety during the session (n = 2), frustration during the session (n = 1), and 
fatigue at the time of evaluation (n = 2); no other descriptors of irregular behavior were made.  
Thus, in at least 48 (81%) of the probable noncredible cases, clients were not behaviorally 
identified as putting forth questionably valid performance even though the combination of 
embedded validity measures indicated otherwise, highlighting importance of including measures 
of validity in psychoeducational evaluations and replicating and amplifying the cautions 
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espoused by Faust and Ziskin (1988) regarding the failure of clinicians to be able to identify 
noncredible performance based on performance observations alone. 
Hypothesis 4 
It is hypothesized that those with self-reported pre-existing cognitive disorders will 
have a lower rate of noncredible performance as they have previously established that they 
have cognitive deficits in order to obtain external gain. Therefore, they may not feel the 
need to exaggerate their deficits. To test the assumption that self-reported history of diagnosed 
learning problems, special education, cognitive disorders, or diagnosed attentional conditions 
would not be associated with increased failure on the indices, Chi Square Tests of Independence 
were conducted with history of self-reported cognitive problems as the independent measure and 
proportion of failure on each of the indices as dependent measures.  
As can be seen in Table 17, such self-report was not associated with noncredible 
performance on individual indices after controlling for multiple comparisons by adjusting the 
significance level (p < .0035). Nevertheless, results from a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test revealed  
that, overall, failure on validity indices was actually associated with those reporting a history of 
cognitive problems compared to those not reporting such a history, W+ (14) = 83, p < .05. Also 
counter to hypothesis four, this variable was associated with performing in the probable 
noncredible range according to Slick Criteria as 25 (4.6%) of those without a history of cognitive 
problems fell into the probable noncredible range while 34 (7.7%) of those with such self-
reported problems met criteria for probable noncredible performance, χ2 (1) = 4.14,  p = .042. 
Therefore, those with a history of cognitive problems tended to fail the indices and their pattern 
and rates of failure also resulted in higher incidents of Criterion B classification. As a result, this 
hypothesis was not generally supported, but there were conflicting findings. 
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Table 17 
Rates of Noncredible Performance by History of Cognitive Problems* 
 
History of 
Cognitive 
Problems 
(n = 440) 
 
No History of 
Cognitive 
Problems 
(n = 541) 
 Index 
n (%)  n (%) 
    
Working Memory < 70 5 (1.2)  3 (0.6) 
    
Processing Speed < 70 5 (1.6)  5 (1.0) 
    
Digit Span Scaled Score < 4a 10 (2.3)  3 (0.6) 
    
Aud. Rec. Raw < 42 11 (2.6)  7 (1.3) 
    
Faces I Raw < 23 2 (0.5)  4 (0.8) 
    
Max. Digits Fwd. < 4 15 (3.5)  11 (2.1) 
    
Mittenberg Index > .21a 150 (35.1)  145 (28.2) 
    
Reliable Digits < 6 26 (6.1)  18 (3.4) 
    
Voc.-Digit Span > 4 128 (29.7)  150 (28.7) 
    
Ord et al. Index > 3a 20 (4.6)  12 (2.3) 
    
Rarely Missed Index < 40 0 (0.0)  3 (0.6) 
    
Roger’s Function > 60ta 76 (24.9)  63 (17.8) 
    
Malingering Index > 3 11 (3.6)  17 (4.8) 
    
Neg. Imp. Mgt > 81ta 10 (3.3)  26 (7.4) 
    
*Reflects percentage of participants in analyses. 
a
p < .05 
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Hypothesis 5 
It is expected that those meeting Slick Criteria for probable MND in the current 
study will be diagnosed with current brain based disorders (e.g., Cognitive Disorder NOS, 
ADHD, LD) most frequently as an outcome of their current psychoeducational evaluation. 
This hypothesis was investigated by subdividing the probable MND group and remaining clinical 
group according to DSM-IV-TR diagnostic category. As can be seen in Table 18, 79.7%  
(n = 47) of those meeting Slick Criteria were diagnosed with some mental disorder according to 
their psychoeducational evaluation, which was slightly higher, but not significantly different 
from that observed in the remainder of the total clinical sample (n = 693, 74.8%), χ2 (1) = .71,  p 
= .40. However, the percentage of the remaining clinical group diagnosed with a psychiatric 
diagnosis was higher (n = 239, 25.8%) than those in the MND group (n = 8, 13.6%), χ2 (1) = 4.4, 
p = .036. In contrast, the rate of being diagnosed with a brain based disorder in the probable 
MND group (n = 38, 64.4%) was higher than the remainder of the entire clinical group (49.1%, n 
= 455), χ2 (1) = 5.2, p = .02. Thus, while the rate of diagnoses did not appear to be higher in the 
probable MND group compared with the remainder of the clinical group as a whole, the rate of 
disorders specifically related to cognitive dysfunction was higher. Support of this hypothesis 
suggests that those meeting Slick Criteria in this sample obtained a disproportionate rate of 
cognitive diagnoses despite strong evidence from the embedded measures that they likely 
exaggerated deficits. Information regarding diagnostic comorbidity in the MND group is 
presented in Table 19.  
Related to Hypothesis Five is the observance that the frequency of psychiatric diagnoses 
in the No External Incentive (n = 158, 33%) group was higher than the External Incentive group 
(n = 89, 17.5%), χ2 (1) = 31.7, p < .001. However, in mirroring the findings of the MND 
analyses, the proportion of those diagnosed with a brain-based disorder in the External 
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Table 18 
Frequency and Percentage of Primary Axis I Diagnoses in the Probable MND Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 n   %  
     
Major Depressive Episode 1  1.7  
     
Generalized Anxiety Disorder 1  1.7  
     
Bipolar Disorder 1  1.7  
     
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 1  1.7  
     
Cyclothymic Disorder 1  1.7  
     
Adjustment Disorder 1  1.7  
     
Academic Problem 1  1.7  
     
Autism Spectrum Disorder 1  1.7  
     
Information Unavailable 1  1.7  
     
Anxiety Disorder, NOS 2  3.4  
     
Reading Disorder 2  3.4  
     
Math Disorder 2  3.4  
     
Disorder of Written Expression 2  3.4  
     
Diagnosis Deferred 2  3.4  
     
Amnestic Disorder 4  6.8  
     
Learning Disorder, NOS 7  11.9  
     
Cognitive Disorder, NOS 8  13.6  
     
No Diagnosis 8  13.6  
     
ADHD 13  22  
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Table 19 
Frequency and Percentage of Cases by Co-Occurring Secondary Diagnostic Category in the 
Probable MND Group 
 
 
 n   %  
     
Depressive Disorders 2  3.4  
     
Anxiety Disorders 6  10.2  
     
Adjustment Disorders 1  1.7  
     
Schizoaffective Disorder 1  1.7  
     
ADHD 4  6.8  
     
Learning Disorders 3  5.1  
     
Misc. V-Codes 2  3.4  
     
 
Incentive (n = 316, 62.2%) group was higher than the No External Incentive group (n = 183, 
38.3%), χ2 (1) = 56.4, p < .001. Taken together, the results suggest that even overtly seeking an 
external incentive in a psychoeducational evaluation is associated with obtaining a diagnosis for 
a brain-based disorder.  
Hypothesis 6 
This hypothesis predicts that those clients meeting Slick Criteria for probable MND were 
likely to be recommended to receive academic accommodations and/or be recommended 
for a medication consultation at a higher rate than those not meeting criteria for probable 
MND. The author tested hypothesis six via Chi Square Test of Independence by calculating the 
number of individuals recommended to receive academic accommodations and/or medication. 
The author first compared proportions of recommendations between the External Incentive (n = 
343, 71.0%) and No External Incentive group (n = 211, 47.4%), which indicated a significant 
finding, χ2 (1) = 53.61, p = .00001. The next analysis compared the derived probable MND group 
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and remaining combined clinical groups according to receiving recommendations for medication 
referral and/or academic accommodations by using Chi Square Test of Independence. According 
to that analysis, 43 (75.4%) of those in the probable group and 511 (58.7%) of the remaining 
clinical patients received one of those recommendations, χ2 (1) = 6.25, p = .012. However, those 
meeting Slick Criteria for MND did not receive those recommendations at a higher rate than 
those in the remaining External Incentive group (n = 300, 70%), suggesting the recommendation 
of accommodations might more likely be related to participants’ status as members of the 
External Incentive group than their actual classification as probable MND.  
Hypothesis 7 
The specificity levels of each validity index will be greater when those meeting the 
Slick Criteria are compared to the Control group rather than when compared to the No 
External Incentive group and remaining External Incentive group. Sensitivity and 
specificity levels were calculated according to proportion of those falling above and below cutoff 
scores per group based on comparisons between the probable MND and the control group (Table 
20), No External Incentive group (Table 21), and the remaining External Incentive group (non- 
probable MND clinical group; Table 22). Values for positive predictive power are provided for 
each index according to several theoretical base rate conditions (10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%) by 
using the calculations outlined by Baldessarini et al. (1983). 
The greatest margin of specificity differences between the groups was with Reliable 
Digits, which is also the most well validated measure of validity among the indices and the most 
specific to detecting noncredible performance. That measure was also followed by the Working 
Memory Index and Processing Speed Index indicators as the most specific to probable MND in 
this sample. As can be seen from the tables, specificity levels for each index were higher in the 
Control group than both clinical groups, supporting the hypothesis. Specificity was also lower, as 
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a whole, in the No External Incentive group when compared with the External Incentive group 
after removing probable MND clients, W- (13) = 65.5, p = .02. This latter finding was surprising 
due to the fact that external incentive was shown, in the previous analyses, to be related to testing 
scores and validity index scores. An increased failure rate was expected due to the fact that the 
remainder of the External Incentive group presumably had motivation to feign deficits. This 
finding may reflect an artifact such that experimental group assignment may not have achieved 
pure groups or may be related to other factors noted in the discussion. Other observations from 
the tables indicate that when obtaining a failed index score, the probability for noncredible 
performance is increased, especially in conditions where the base rate exceeds 20%. However, 
the diagnostic confidence in any one failed measure decreases as a direct function of decreasing 
hypothetical base rates as has been shown elsewhere (Gouvier, 1999). 
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Table 20 
Sensitivity, Specificity, and Positive Predictive Power for Validity Indices for Control Group 
 
  
Positive Predictive Power for Base Rates 
 
Spec  Sens  .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 
          
Working Memory < 70 100  6.8  100 100 100 100 100 
          
Processing Speed < 70 100  15.3  100 100 100 100 100 
          
Digit Span Scaled Score < 4 100  8.5  100 100 100 100 100 
          
Aud. Rec. Raw < 42 100  11.9  100 100 100 100 100 
          
Faces I Raw < 23 100  1.7  100 100 100 100 100 
          
Max. Digits Fwd. < 4 98.4  6.8  32 52 65 74 81 
          
Mittenberg Index > .21 76.9  86.4  29 48 62 71 79 
          
Reliable Digits < 6 98.1  79.7  82 91 95 97 98 
          
Voc.-Digit Span > 4 88  39  27 45 58 68 76 
          
Ord et al. Index > 3 100  15.2  100 100 100 100 100 
          
Rarely Missed Index < 40 100  0  100 100 100 100 100 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
Table 21 
Sensitivity, Specificity, and Positive Predictive Power for Validity Indices for No External 
Incentive 
 
 
  
Positive Predictive Power for Base Rates 
 
Spec  Sens  .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 
          
Working Memory < 70 99.6  6.8  65 81 88 92 94 
          
Processing Speed < 70 99.1  15.3  65 81 88 92 94 
          
Digit Span Scaled Score < 4 99.1  8.5  51 70 80 86 90 
          
Aud. Rec. Raw < 42 99.4  11.9  69 83 89 93 95 
          
Faces I Raw < 23 98.2  1.7  9 19 29 39 49 
          
Max. Digits Fwd. < 4 97.8  6.8  26 44 57 67 76 
          
Mittenberg Index > .21 72  86.4  26 44 57 67 76 
          
Reliable Digits < 6 97.4  79.7  77 88 93 95 97 
          
Voc.-Digit Span > 4 72.7  39  14 26 38 49 59 
          
Ord et al. Index > 3 97.4  15.2  39 59 71 80 85 
          
Rarely Missed Index < 40 99.4  0  0 0 0 0 0 
          
Roger’s Function > 60ta 80.7  65.5  27 46 59 69 77 
          
Malingering Index > 3a 96.1  14.5  29 48 61 71 79 
          
Neg. Imp. Mgt > 81ta 93.4  20  25 43 56 67 75 
          
aIndex not administered to control participants. 
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Table 22 
Sensitivity, Specificity, and Positive Predictive Power for Validity Indices for External Incentive 
- Not Probable Group 
 
 
  
Positive Predictive Power for Base Rates 
 
Spec  Sens  .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 
          
Working Memory < 70 99.5  6.8  60 77 85 90 93 
          
Processing Speed < 70 100  15.3  100 100 100 100 100 
          
Digit Span Scaled Score < 4 99.1  8.5  51 70 80 86 90 
          
Aud. Rec. Raw < 42 98.2  11.9  42 62 74 82 87 
          
Faces I Raw < 23 99.1  1.7  17 32 45 56 65 
          
Max. Digits Fwd. < 4 97.3  6.8  22 39 52 63 72 
          
Mittenberg Index > .21 73  86.4  26 44 58 68 76 
          
Reliable Digits < 6 95.5  79.7  66 82 88 92 95 
          
Voc.-Digit Span > 4 73.8  39  14 27 39 50 60 
          
Ord et al. Index > 3 97.5  15.2  40 60 72 80 86 
          
Rarely Missed Index < 40 99.9  0  0 0 0 0 0 
          
Roger’s Function > 60ta 85  65.5  33 52 65 74 81 
          
Malingering Index > 3a 97.3  14.5  37 57 70 78 84 
          
Neg. Imp. Mgt > 81ta 98.3  20  57 75 83 89 92 
          
aIndex not administered to control participants. 
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Discussion 
 Performance validity is crucial to consider when conducting and interpreting 
neuropsychological testing (Bianchini et al., 2001; Slick et al., 1999). The assessment of client 
credibility has been especially stressed when results can be used to demonstrate evidence for 
disability status and/or to receive external gain (Bush et al., 2005). Traditionally, feigned 
symptoms or deficit/symptom exaggeration has been a concern in the context of litigation, 
workers’ compensation, and other situations that may result in financial rewards or relief from 
occupational or other duties (Mittenberg et al., 2002). More recently, focus has been turned to 
investigate the context of potentially exaggerated neurocognitive deficits in other situations as 
well (Delis & Wetter, 2007). In the current study, the author investigated the relationship of 
overtly seeking academic accommodations and/or medication referrals and neurocognitive 
performance in a university setting through several hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1 
Those in the External Incentive group will show significantly lower performance on 
the WAIS-III and WMS-III when compared to the No External Incentive and Control 
groups, particularly on measures of thinking speed and attention. This hypothesis was 
generally supported as the External Incentive group performed significantly lower than the No 
External Incentive group on 10 of 13 subtests from the WAIS-III. Although the External 
Incentive group did score lower than the No External Incentive group on the remaining three 
subtests (Similarities, Comprehension, & Picture Arrangement), the difference did not reach 
statistical significance using parametric tests of significance. Comparison of the External 
Incentive group with the Control group also showed significantly lower performance on 11 of 13 
WAIS-III subtests with the exception of Comprehension and Picture Arrangement. All 
comparisons fell in the expected direction nonparametrically, further supporting this hypothesis.  
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In contrast to the WAIS-III comparisons, the External Incentive group performed 
significantly lower than the No External Incentive group on only the Logical Memory subtests 
when contrasting WMS-III memory performance. While the External Incentive group performed 
significantly lower on only the Logical Memory subtests in that comparison, they did show 
lower absolute scores across all WMS-III subtests, albeit the differences did not rise to statistical 
significance parametrically. An additional follow-up Wilcoxon signed rank test did indicate that, 
on the whole, the External Incentive group scores on the WMS-III were significantly consistently 
lower than those with no explicit motivation for external secondary gain and controls. 
The parametric finding that the External Incentive group performed significantly different 
from the other clinical group on only Logical Memory in the WMS-III comparison was not 
particularly surprising due to the nature of the referrals to the clinic and the face validity of the 
measure. For example, the overwhelming majority of referrals to the clinic were sought for 
attentional complaints and/or academic difficulties. Since the WMS-III appears as an obvious 
memory measure, clients seeking to exaggerate neurocognitive deficits within the present sample 
did not likely view the WMS-III as a measure relevant to their alleged current deficits, thus 
deficits would not be exaggerated on those tests. This is supported by the fact that the largest 
group differences among the WAIS-III subtests related to attentional functioning (i.e., Digit 
Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Digit-Symbol Coding, and Symbol Search). 
In contrast, the Logical Memory subtests in particular, requires a high level of attentional 
skill and cognitive load and may be more likely viewed by the client as a measure relevant to 
attentional assessment. Therefore, the two memory measures on the WMS-III that appear most 
similar to attentional functioning were performed at the lowest level among clients explicitly 
seeking evaluation as a means to obtain an external incentive. Despite this, all scores fell in the 
hypothesized direction which resulted in significant nonparametric findings when considering  
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score ranks between groups across all measures of intelligence and memory. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis two proposed that the External Incentive group will perform 
significantly different from the other two groups (No External Incentive and Control) on 
all validity indices, indicating a higher level of noncredible performance. Hypothesis two 
was imperfectly but strongly supported with the External Incentive group performing 
significantly different from the No External Incentive group on half of the 10 indices from the 
WAIS-III/WMS-III. All remaining five parametrically nonsignificant findings with this 
comparison fell in the expected direction and the hypothesis was fully supported through 
nonparametric analyses. Similarly, the External Incentive group performed significantly different 
on seven of the 10 indices when contrasted with the Control group, with all comparisons falling 
in the expected direction, indicating a higher degree of noncredible performance. Again, all 
nonsignificant findings also fell in the expected direction with additional follow-up Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests indicating that the External Incentive group scores on the WMS-III validity 
indices were lower than the No External Incentive group. Additionally, the No Incentive group 
also performed significantly toward the invalid range on six of 10 WAIS-III/WMS-III validity 
indices when compared to the Control group. The results add validity evidence for the embedded 
measures as the controls performed in the direction of invalidity to a significantly lesser extent 
than clients with and without external incentive. Furthermore, those with stated incentive for 
external gain performed more often in the noncredible range to a significantly greater degree 
than those not seeking some form of expressively stated secondary gain. 
As for the PAI validity indices, the External Incentive group performed significantly 
higher than the No External Incentive group only on the Roger’s Discriminant Function. 
Contrary to expectations, the No External Incentive group mean scores on the Negative 
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Impression Management was higher than the External Incentive group, indicating a higher level 
of noncredible performance on that particular index. There was no group difference in the 
Malingering Index from the PAI. Thus, there was less support for the hypothesis utilizing the 
PAI indices, especially in a standalone capacity. 
Overall, none of the mean scores from any one validity index across all groups fell in the 
noncredible range, indicating the relatively infrequent occurrence of the extreme degree of 
performance required for classification as noncredible. Despite one contradictory finding, the 
majority of results supported the general assertion that those overtly seeking external incentives 
scored differently than both Controls and those clients not overtly seeking external incentives. In 
sum, with additional support from the first hypothesis, these results suggest that clients’ explicit 
motivation for testing influences neurocognitive test performance and failure rates on validity 
indices as well. Not only that, but it also appears that those without explicit external incentive 
seeking behaviors in this context score differently on validity indices than those from the normal 
population, which will be addressed below. 
Hypothesis 3 & Classification of Noncredible Performance 
The rate of noncredible performance as per Slick Criteria in the entire combined 
clinical sample is expected to be similar to the rates in other general clinical settings where 
compensation seeking is a factor (20%) and the rate should be significantly higher among 
persons in the External Incentive group. It was generally expected that the proportion of 
noncredible findings on validity indices would be similar to a recent observation in a similar 
sample (Sullivan et al., 2007). Overall, 46% of the clients in the External Incentive group met 
Slick Criteria for at least possible MND because they failed at least one index from the WAIS-
III/WMS-III. This was greater than in the No External Incentive group (36.8%), which was on 
par with recent reports of failure rates of four embedded validity measures in neuropsychological 
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patients not meeting Slick Criteria (Victor, Boone, Serpa, Buehler, & Zeigler, In Press). A 
surprise finding among the control group was a comparably high rate of validity test failures on 
individual measures (32.4%), particularly on the Mittenberg Index and Vocabulary Minus Digit 
Span which runs counter to what was expected, especially considering this study employed 
conservative cutoff scores (Inman & Berry, 2002; Orey et al., 2000). In all, the failure rates 
across groups in the current study were above the single index failure rate (22%) from the Word 
Memory Test as reported by Sullivan et al. (2007). The overall profile of failure rates supported 
the nonparametric dimensionality as hypothesized with the highest failure in the External 
Incentive group followed by the No External Incentive and then Control participants.  
Despite the seemingly high failure rate on individual indices, Hypothesis Three was not 
fully supported as the proportion of clients in the entire clinical group satisfying Slick Criteria 
for probable MND was only 6%. This figure did rise to 12% as a proportion of the External 
Incentive group alone, though it was far below the expected 50% noted in other settings with a 
high rate of external incentive seeking (Mittenberg et al., 2002). Therefore, although groups with 
an increased prior probability for malingering contain a higher number of participants meeting 
Slick Criteria, the number here did not rise to traditionally high levels consonant with other 
highly saturated groups (i.e., defense referrals). Beyond the issue of meeting full criteria for 
probable MND (seeking external incentive), 9.7% of the No External Incentive group also 
satisfied criterion B of the Slick Criteria (as outlined in the Methods section) when the PAI was 
included in the decision matrix. As a whole then, 10.2% of the entire clinical group, irrespective 
of incentive seeking status, met criterion B of the Slick Criteria. At minimum, this strongly 
suggests the regular identification of some form of noncredible performance on neurocognitive 
testing even in those not seeking overtly stated external incentives. However, that does not 
necessarily imply malingered performance per se. On the other hand, despite the fact that 32.4% 
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off the controls failed at least one validity index, no control participant met Criterion B of the 
Slick Criteria. Consequently, no control participant was falsely identified as a malingerer.  
The rate of suspected MND in this sample decreased dramatically when using only the 
WAIS-III/WMS-III validity indices as the means with which to meet Slick Criteria (3.5% of the 
External Incentive group, 0.9% of the No External Incentive group). Therefore, only 3% of the 
total sample met Criterion B without using the PAI indices, suggesting a high false negative rate 
when relying solely on the Wechsler scales to detect noncredible performance.  
Due to the fact that the rates of probable MND were lower than expected, and lower than 
other current estimates in similar samples (Sullivan et al., 2007), it is assumed to be an 
underestimate. However, Sullivan et al. (2007) did not specifically address the issue of MND as 
per Slick Criteria, but simply reported failure rates on singular indices from the Word Memory 
Test. Therefore, their report of 22% failure rates do not reflect derivation of malingered 
behavior. Though failure rates on multiple indices from the Word Memory Test were likely 
substantially lower in that study, they were not reported. Moreover, they did not control for 
external incentive seeking and their level may indicate a 22% rate of possible MND, but it is 
unclear because they did not account for compensation seeking.  
One reason for the somewhat low rate of probable MND in the current sample is the 
classification scheme employed in this study utilized a very stringent and conservative 
methodology to categorize clients according to the probable MND Slick Criteria (Boone, 2007b; 
Larrabee, Greiffenstein, Greve, & Bianchini, 2007). This included using indices with above 90% 
specificity as empirically established in brain injured groups, samples with significant cognitive 
impairment beyond what is typically associated with specific LD and ADHD and certainly more 
impairment than university students (Belanger, Curtiss, Demery, Lebowitz, & Vanderploeg, 
2005; Belanger & Vanderploeg, 2005). Hence, failure rates in the current sample are not likely  
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due to the mild level of impairment typically served in university clinics. 
The author also used multiple indicators according to varying principles (e.g., self-report, 
floor effect, performance curve methodologies) to determine noncredible performance that 
guarded against capitalizing on chance for meeting Criterion B of the Slick Criteria by requiring 
failure on two or more nonoverlapping validity indices (Rosenfeld, Sands, & Van Gorp, 2000). 
Furthermore, the lower rate of probable MND in this sample occurred despite the fact that some 
of the current measures (Mittenberg Index and Vocabulary-Digit Span) performed with 
unacceptably low specificity in the comparable control sample when contrasted with the extant 
literature, even when using conservative cutoff scores. As a result, using either the Mittenberg 
Index or Vocabulary-Digit Span in isolation in samples similar to those used in the present study 
is not recommended due to decreased specificity. Indeed, using only the WAIS-III/WMS-III, 
32.4% of the Control group scored in the noncredible range on at least one validity indicator, 
representing low specificity (high false positive rate), which highlights the need to use multiple 
validity indicators (Larrabee, 2007a; Meyers & Volbrecht, 2003). However, singular indices may 
serve utility as initial, preliminary screening measures of invalid test performance due to the 
literature base that supports their usage. In this way, noting failure on one measure increases the 
post-test odds of noncredibility, but does not confirm it. Nonetheless, the reason for high failure 
rates on individual indices in the Control sample and No External Incentive group remains 
somewhat unclear in this study especially considering patients with marked neurological patients 
were excluded from this study. One explanation is that a proportion of clients classified in the No 
External Incentive group actually had an incentive, but did not overtly make that known at the 
time of the evaluation. Thus, the substantially lowered proportion meeting Criterion B likely 
represents the lower limit of noncredible performance in this population, and those meeting 
probable criteria for MND represent the extreme cases of MND. 
101 
Hypothesis 4 
It is hypothesized that those with self-reported pre-existing cognitive disorders will 
have a lower rate of noncredible performance as they have previously established that they 
have cognitive deficits in order to obtain external gain. Therefore, they may not feel the 
need to exaggerate their deficits. The author also investigated the relationship of a self-reported 
history of diagnosed cognitive problems and scoring below the cutoff on validity indices. It was 
expected that those with such a history would not score below cutoff criteria on the validity 
measures at a higher rate than those without that history. However, those with a history of 
cognitive problems were more likely to present for testing to obtain accommodations at the 
university and/or for standardized “high stakes” placement tests (e.g., American College Test, 
etc.). Therefore, the external incentive to perform poorly on the neurocognitive testing was quite 
salient in this subgroup of clients. As such, those with a history of cognitive problems and 
scholastic struggles were actually more likely to meet Slick Criteria for probable MND than 
those without that background. This may be partly due to previous involvement in 
neurocognitive testing, resulting in familiarity with the fact that one needs to demonstrate (or 
exaggerate) deficits in order to receive a diagnosis. As a result of experience with testing 
situations and previous external gains as a function of that testing and disorder familiarity, the 
effect may be similar to being coached as to the types of deficits needed to be accentuated to 
obtain a diagnosis. It is thought that this possibility may be a function of time since diagnoses. 
For example, the majority of individuals in the pre-existing diagnosis group may have recently 
obtained diagnoses rather than being diagnosed in childhood. It was rationally derived that those 
diagnosed in childhood would expect professions to retain their cognitive diagnosis by virtue of 
long-standing problems and they would not feel the need to exaggerate deficits. Therefore, in the 
future, it would be important to analyze differences in validity failure rates as a function of time 
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since diagnoses (i.e., diagnosis rendered in childhood versus adulthood). To conclude, those 
clients with pre-existing diagnoses presenting to clinics to establish a diagnosis to receive 
external secondary gain may have a higher prior probability of exaggerating or feigning deficits, 
contrary to this hypothesis, and raises the question of whether many of these previously 
diagnosed individuals obtained their original diagnoses via simulation. 
Hypothesis 5 
It is expected that those meeting Slick Criteria for probable MND will be diagnosed 
with current brain based disorders (e.g., Cognitive Disorder NOS, ADHD, LD) most 
frequently as an outcome of their current psychoeducational evaluation. Initially, it was not 
thought that this hypothesis was supported because the rate of any primary Axis I mental 
disorders in the probable MND group (79.7%) was very similar to the rate in those not meeting 
Slick Criteria (75%). However, a more fine-grained, theory-driven reanalysis showed that the 
rate of being diagnosed with a brain-based disorder (e.g., ADHD, LD, Cognitive Disorder) 
according to their current psychoeducational evaluation was increased in the probable MND 
group (64%) compared with those not meeting probable MND criteria (49%). Therefore, those 
meeting criteria for probable MND obtained a brain-based diagnosis more often than those 
demonstrating wholly credible performance. In particular, those meeting Slick Criteria were 
successful in feigning/exaggerating deficits to the extent that they obtained diagnoses to justify 
receiving external gain.  
Hypothesis 6 
Those clients meeting criteria for probable MND were likely to be recommended to 
receive academic accommodations and/or be recommended for a stimulant medication 
consultation at a higher rate than those not meeting criteria for probable MND. Related to 
hypothesis five, there was an association for clinical group status as 71% of the External 
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Incentive group and 47% of those in the No External Incentive clinical group received such 
recommendations based on current psychoeducational results. Moreover, those meeting Slick 
Criteria for probable MND had a 75.4% rate of receiving recommendations as opposed to 58.7% 
of the clients not meeting Slick Criteria.  
As with the first, second, third, and fourth hypotheses, there was support for an 
association of clinical group status (No External Incentive & External Incentive) with outcomes 
from current testing and diagnoses. In this case, it was shown that the group of clients visiting 
the clinic with explicit intentions of obtaining secondary gain did in fact receive a high rate of 
desired recommendations. This finding was higher than expected given the low rates of probable 
MND, suggesting that the estimation of probable MND was actually too low (high number of 
false negatives). The sixth hypothesis also supported the assertion that those meeting probable 
Slick Criteria actually succeeded in demonstrating a neurocognitive impairment profile that 
warranted formal recommendations for academic accommodations and/or stimulant medication 
referral. Furthermore, 70% of those in the External Incentive group (with the MND clients 
removed) obtained desired recommendations, indicating a strong effect for seeking external gain. 
Only a small percentage of those patients were identified as putting forth questionable effort at 
the time of the evaluation via behavioral observations and none were diagnosed with MND. In 
sum, university students seeking incentives appear to be able exaggerate symptoms to obtain 
desired outcomes, and they are not likely identified without symptom validity testing. 
Hypothesis 7 
The specificity levels would be greater when those meeting the Slick Criteria for 
probable MND are compared to the Control group rather than when compared to the No 
External Incentive group and remaining External Incentive group. Following the findings 
that the No External Incentive group failed the validity indices at a higher rate than the Control 
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sample, specificity levels for each index followed this pattern (see Tables 19, 20, & 21). Despite 
the fact that the instruments were validated with brain injured samples to establish cutoff criteria, 
research has also shown higher failure rates in credible clinical samples compared with 
nonpatient samples (Victor et al., In Press), which was also demonstrated by differential 
specificity values in the No External Incentive and the clients seeking external incentive, but not 
meeting Slick Criteria for MND. As a result of the varying specificity levels, predictive values of 
the tests were altered with increasing classification certainty obtained when utilizing the Control 
group as the comparison sample (see Table 20). The two poorest predictive values in the Control 
participant comparison were those with the highest failure rate (Mittenberg Index and 
Vocabulary minus Digits) as well.  
Those two indices share validation samples in original research that did not include an 
adequate proportion of participants with normal and high intellectual quotients as were present in 
the current university sample. Since both of these indices are essentially based on utilizing a 
subtest discrepancy analysis, the high failure rates in the current study may reflect problems with 
applying that approach in high functioning samples. For instance, it has been widely noted that 
subtest discrepancies on intelligence scales are more common in those with above average FSIQs 
(Hawkins & Tulsky, 2001; Saklofske, Tulsky, Wilkins, & Weiss, 2003). While the Vocabulary 
minus Digit Span index has been investigated in a large normative sample (Iverson & Tulsky, 
2003), failure rates have not been stratified by overall intellectual level, which likely results in 
underestimating the false positive rate of that index. No such normative comparisons with the 
Mittenberg Index exist for WAIS-III standardization sample, and attempts to obtain the relevant 
data have been unsuccessful (Psychological Corporation, personal communication, November 
2007). Therefore, other data regarding the appropriate applicability of the two discrepancy based 
validity indices to high FSIQ samples are lacking. Despite the high failure on those measures in  
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normal controls, all other indices demonstrated excellent specificity ranging from 98.1 to 1.00. 
 In the current sample, there are at least three other reasons for why the specificity and 
predictive values differed when comparing the MND group with the No External Incentive group 
and the remaining credible clients in the External Incentive group and those rather than the 
Control group. First, it may be that there was an actual increased “false positive” rate in the No 
External Incentive group and the portion of those with external incentive that did not meet full 
Criterion B evidence. Interpretation from other research illuminates this interpretation if the 
operational definition of a false positive is declaring someone a malingerer based on Slick 
Criteria. In this case, the test objectively over-identifies those who actually demonstrate credible 
performance in the context of seeking an external gain as well as those without such motives. 
Second, because of the retrospective group assignment, the “false positive” cases may actually 
be true positives that were misassigned to the No External Incentive group, precluding the 
application of the Slick Criteria to those clients (not meeting Criterion A). Thus, those clients 
classified by testing as “false positives” clients in the No external Incentive group are actually 
false negative cases due to the quasi-experimental manipulation and not due to the psychometric 
characteristics of the failed validity indices, thus being initial classification errors. For example, 
if a client was seeking external incentive, but did not explicitly state that, he or she would have 
been misclassified into the No External Incentive group in the current study, contaminating the 
purity of the experimental groups. Conversely, the established psychometric properties of the 
indices and previous research may actually over identify credible patients, which would indicate 
that the false positive findings in the No External Incentive group identified true cases of MND.  
The last possibility, and perhaps the most overlooked in the research on MND, is that the 
No External Incentive group contained several individuals seeking evaluation based on a priori 
set of psychological needs to demonstrate personal pathology. Thus, the high “false positive” 
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rates reflect a tendency to present with somatoform and/or factitious features, rendering the 
testing noncredible. While Delis and Wetter (2007) and others (Binder, 2007; Boone, 2007a; 
Larrabee, 2007b) have recognized that factors other than substantial external secondary gain may 
relate to feigned neurocognitive performance, the area remains understudied. This is particularly 
the case regarding the explanation of so-called false positive rates of validity tests in patient 
samples with no apparent external incentives from participating in the evaluation process. In this 
manner, false positive results are viewed as test properties while excluding other more recent 
conceptualizations of somatic and cognitive symptom feigning, resulting in “overshadowing” 
alternative explanations. Thus, the false positive rates reported in patient samples may reflect an 
underlying cogniform syndrome that drives failures on neuropsychological validity tests and not 
simply psychometric noise. This is potentially problematic given the high rates of suspected 
noncredibility across settings, as effort and financial incentives have been shown to account for 
significant variance in neuropsychological test performance (Binder & Rohling, 1996; Green et 
al., 2001) and there are few guidelines in place to aid the clinician when deciding how to 
interpret neurocognitive performance in the presence of failed validity testing and no apparent 
external incentive. 
Limitations 
Although the general findings indicated that the External Incentive group performed 
more poorly than the No External Incentive group on the subtests from the WAIS-III/WMS-III, 
not all comparisons were statistically significant when applying parametric techniques. However, 
nonparametrically, the significant overall tendency was that the External Incentive group 
performed lower than the No External Incentive group much more often. The External Incentive 
group scored significantly differently than the No External Incentive group on the validity 
indices in an imperfectly consistent manner, though nonparametric results indicate the overall  
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tendency to score in the direction noncredible direction.  
Thus, the first two hypotheses were supported and some of the mild inconsistencies may 
have been an experimental artifact in the grouping variables. For instance, the level of external 
incentive seeking was determined via retrospective chart reviews wherein information regarding 
the clients’ true reason for obtaining the evaluation may not have been, at times, explicitly stated. 
Therefore, in those cases, the author grouped those clients into the No External Incentive group 
as a means to avoid mislabeling those individuals as meeting criteria for MND in keeping with 
the conservative approach in this study. Please note that in order to meet Slick Criteria, one has 
to have external incentive (Criterion A). Because of this, the No External Incentive group likely 
contained individuals who actually had an external incentive (i.e., seeking accommodations or 
medications), but did not directly indicate their motivation at the time of evaluation, resulting in 
a contaminated group. As a result, participants with external incentive were likely classified as 
not having external incentive. Moreover, those misclassified clients could not meet Slick Criteria 
as a function of that group assignment. However, that experimental artifact may actually bolster 
the robustness of the significant findings because it is thought that those individuals that may 
have been misclassified into the No External Incentive group should have performed similarly to 
clients in the External Incentive group thereby diluting the group differences, which likely only 
happened to a small degree. This potential situation would also be similar to typical clinical 
practice where the clinician is often uncertain as to the clients’ explicit motivation for evaluation. 
Additionally, it is also possible that a client’s explicit denial of external incentives may not be 
credible because they may refuse to admit such motivational factors. 
Despite the significant group differences, it may also be possible that those in the 
External Incentive group may have performed lower on the WAIS-III/WMS-III due to 
differences related to actual functioning. For instance, it could be that those with bonafide 
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neurocognitive problems more readily expressed their intentions to receive external gain, and 
were categorized as such. Be that as it may, the External Incentive group still performed toward 
the noncredible range on the validity indices more often than the No External Incentive group, 
which calls into question that possibility. 
 Another limitation of this study relates to the use of validity measures validated for use in 
a medico-/psycholegal context and with neurological groups that have largely not included 
clients diagnosed with ADHD or LD. Therefore, the appropriateness of assigning labels of 
noncredible performance or malingering to clients in the present sample may be premature. To 
counteract those concerns, the author utilized conservative cutoff scores to minimize false 
positive findings of noncredible performance based on specificity levels across a number of 
empirical findings. 
The high number of control participants failing the Mittenberg Index and Vocabulary 
minus Digit Span does call into question the use of cutscores for those measures in a university 
sample. Each of those two indices is based on score discrepancies within the intellectual domain, 
which may partially explain their low specificity in this sample given the increasing occurrence 
of such discrepancies as IQ scores become higher and higher. For instance, it has been noted that 
individuals with high intellectual quotients are more likely to show less uniform intellectual 
abilities than those with low or average functioning (Hawkins & Tulsky, 2001). As a result, large 
and frequent score discrepancies across intellectual abilities (i.e., a high degree of subtest scatter) 
are expected in those with above average intelligence. Given that the control participants were 
comprised of well-educated university students, the tendency for positive findings on the 
Mittenberg Index and Vocabulary minus Digit Span may have reflected true discrepancies in 
scores rather than noncredible performance. However, it has been shown that more extreme 
performance on those validity indices indicates a greater degree of test invalidity (Greve et al., 
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2003; Mittenberg et al., 2001), which was also supported by the group comparisons but also 
suggests that the cutoff score in this population may need modification for future use. This topic 
also highlights that reliance on the observation of any single validity indicator is likely to result 
in false findings of MND (Boone, 2007b; Bush et al., 2005; Larrabee, 2007a; Larrabee et al., 
2007; Meyers & Volbrecht, 2003; Rosenfeld et al., 2000; Victor et al., In Press). Therefore, the 
use of a multiple methods and validity tests should be employed to guard against undue 
stigmatization. 
Perhaps the greatest limitation of the current study is that there was no independently 
validated patient group meeting Slick Criteria using measures outside the scope of this study. 
Because of this, it is not possible to definitively state that those meeting Slick Criteria according 
to the current methodology were, in fact, feigning deficits in order to receive an external gain. 
Nonetheless, the number of individuals meeting Slick Criteria in this study did not appear 
excessive and was actually lower than expected given estimates of noncredible performance in 
other clinical settings using samples motivated by different external incentives For instance, 
according to Mittenberg et al. (2002), the rate of MND in patients not involved with litigation or 
seeking compensation approximates 7% and the percentage in samples with high rates of 
external incentives approaches 50%. The percentage of MND found in the current study falls 
well below the high rate and just above the low estimate for MND in other clinical samples, 
suggesting that the rate in the current study were reasonable. 
While the current study did not include an independently validated group of patients 
meeting research criteria for MND, the current literature base has not provided much technical 
guidance in this area for the current population of interest. As noted above, nearly all of the 
research on noncredible neurocognitive performance is concerned with forensic cases having 
identifiable high stakes outcomes that affect public policy, service provision, and public as well 
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as private financial considerations. In fact, mention of nonforensic malingering in particular has 
been sparse and vague (Rogers, Salekin, Sewell, Goldstein, & Leonard, 1998) making it unclear 
if current models of malingering and noncredible performance in forensic and other settings are 
applicable to nonforensic clinical evaluations with less sensational external reasons for seeking 
assessment. Therefore, there are no readily available instruments or methods that directly apply 
to determine credible performance specifically for those seeking ADHD or LD evaluations, 
which reflects the preliminary nature of this study and this area of research.  
Conclusions 
Neuropsychologists spend the majority of their time outside the realm of forensic practice 
(Kanauss, Schatz, & Puente, 2005) and several sources of secondary gain independent of the 
legal arena remain unstudied. The results from this project support extending research and 
clinical investigation of noncredible performance to the academic setting as it was shown that 
there was a relationship between overtly seeking non-financial external incentives and test 
performance. More specifically, as a group, university students who overtly seek academic 
accommodations and/or stimulant medications performed lower on neuropsychological measures 
and showed more failure rates on validity indices than those not overtly seeking such incentives.  
As a result, incentive-seeking can be conceptualized on a continuum that pertains to 
influence of external incentives that includes the perception, desirability, and type of external 
incentive. For instance, failure rates on neuropsychological validity indices and performance on 
neuropsychological tests can be examined based on the degree of incentive present (financial, 
employment status, non-financial awards, etc.). As it relates to the current study, further 
investigations would be well-served to examine the various types of external academic incentives 
(i.e., medication seeking, accommodation seeking) and neuropsychological performance.  
So too, external pressures experienced by clients also need to be examined for an effect  
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and interaction with incentive levels. For instance, in a forensic context, an independently 
wealthy claimant may not view a potential legal $1,000 award as enticing as someone who was 
in debt and laid off of work. In terms of academics, students with high pressure to perform 
scholastically (i.e., low GPA, students on academic probation) may view particular academic 
accommodations as being differentially attractive versus honor students with high GPA. 
Therefore, it will be necessary to further refine and more clearly operationalize how substantial 
particular external incentives may be viewed in the context of neuropsychological evaluations. In 
this vein, a theoretically-driven approach to studying noncredible performance in the context of 
external incentives may be offered in order to elucidate otherwise difficult to explain poor 
neuropsychological performance. 
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